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ABSTRACT 
The focus of this study was the validation of people's 
reports of gunfire in two inner city neighborhoods in the 
Southeast. A survey design was used in which 342 people 
were interviewed by telephone. An ARIMA analysis was 
conducted to determine the relationship between people's 
gunfire reports and 58 days of ShotSpotter recordings. The 
results indicated that the percentage of residents 
reporting the presence of gunfire was a valid predictor of 
night gunfire. However, residents' reports of the actual 
number of gunshots did not appear valid. Reports of 
gunfire did not appear to have a statistically significant 
correlation with 911 gunfire calls. Residents (96. 7%) 
indicated that gunfire had bothered their sleep. People's 
reports of gunfire appear to be one indicator of community 
violence. 
vii 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
In working as a school social worker, 1· gained a new 
perspective on the everyday community life of some children. 
The children lived in a relatively small public housing 
development about seven miles from my home. The school 
social work position was the result of a government grant to 
assist children in becoming academically successful. My 
personal emphasis was working with kindergartners and first 
graders. The goal was for children to gain a good 
foundation for later academic work. The children referred 
from the kindergartner classes were different from the 
older, often defiant adolescents I had frequently worked 
with in years past. They enjoyed hearing stories and 
playing with the stuffed animals in my office. A common 
occurrence was to have a kindergartner teacher ask me to 
work with a particular child because he was having trouble 
paying attention to class work. The following is a modified 
brief account of children' s communication that had a major 
impact on my direction in social work. The account is also 
the basis for questions addressed in this paper. 
1 
Two five-year-old boys were meeting with me in my 
office. This was their third visit. My standard routine 
was to do calming-activities with the children and 
reintegrate them back into the classroom. Following these 
types of activities, teachers· reported that children were 
calmer for the remainder of the day, so this seemed like a 
somewhat successful intervention. On this particular day, I 
was not prepared for dealing with the material in the little 
boys' discussion. The children began talking about the 
gunshots they had heard the previous night. One child told 
the other boy that it was firecrackers. The boy said it 
wasn' t firecrackers. The other child acknowledged that he 
knew it was gunshots but he told himself it was just 
firecrackers. The children proceeded to talk about a man 
being shot on a neighbor' s front porch. One child seemed 
convinced that parts of the dead man's brains were washed 
off the porch. My thought was that both of these boys must 
be making up these stories. My house was only a few miles 
away, and we do not have any problems like this. Also, all 
of us live in a relatively safe, mid-sized city. This is 
not Chicago. I thought the children must be watching too 
much TV. 
2 
·Further discussion with parents and grandparents living 
in the community indicated that the children were not making 
up the stories and that they too often had trouble sleeping 
because of gunfire. Their stories were real, not made-up. 
They were bright, caring children, and they were busy trying 
to make sense of the violent conditions around them. I did 
not consider it acceptable only to do calmin9 or 
socialization activities with someone living in this 
situation. Only dealing with the symptoms of a violent 
community seemed very inadequate. 
Upon further investigation, studies by Garbarino et al. 
(1991) indicate that many housing developments in large 
inner cities are �no place to be a child. " Listening to 
gunfire at night is part of children' s daily lives. 
Children have more pressing concerns than learning consonant 
sounds. They are often afraid at night and they also worry 
about the safety of other family members. The 1999 HUD 
report on gun-related crime indicates that people residing 
in public housing are over twice as likely to suffer from 
firearm-related victimization as other members of the 
population. The report also indicates that public housing 
residents cite gunshots as a major crime problem. Over 50 
3 
percent of the residents of larger public housing 
authorities list gunshots as a major problem in the 
community. The report further states that whether or not 
the fears regarding gunfire are warranted, the perceptions 
have a direct impact on the sense of community in public 
housing developments and their surrounding neighborhoods 
(HUD, 1999) . 
Further review of community research indicates that the 
problems discussed by these children are not unique to their 
public housing development. The following is a review of 
what we know about gunfire and violence in public housing 
developments and an overview of community violence in 
general. 
Prevalence of Community Violence 
Community violence has a major impact on the lives of 
many children living in the United States. In the 1993 
report Losing Generations by the U. S. National Research 
Council on Adolescents in High-risk Settings, researchers 
state that people must reduce the exposure of children and 
adolescents to high-risk settings. The council states that 
reducing the risks generated by violent settings is a 
4 
precondition for reducing many health and life compromising 
behaviors of children. Fortunatei'y, the 1997 "Juvenile 
Justice Update on Violencen indicates that the wave of 
violence is decreasing; however, the levels are still 
alarmingly high. Bilchik, U. S. Office of Juvenile Justice 
and Delinquency Prevention, states·that the forces that were 
responsible for the decade-long increases in juvenile 
violence are· still with us, but may_now be better able to 
counteract them. The 20% decline in murders by juveniles 
between 1993 and 1995 is encouraging. Still, in 1996, 
19, 645 people were murdered by adults and juveniles (UCR, 
1997) . Between 1985 and 1995, 25, 000 juveniles were 
murdered in the United States. 
Heterogeneous Distributions of Community Violence 
For some young people, community life is not a safe 
place for physical growth. In 1995, 72% of the juveniles 
murdered were male, 31. 7% were 16 or 17 years of age, and 
8 3% of older murdered juveniles were killed with a firearm 
(U. S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
1997) . Presently, homicide is the leading cause of death 
for Black males aged 15 to 34 and the second leading cause 
5 
of death for people between 14 and 34 (Center for Disease 
Control, 1998) . This level of violence is not 
representative of other developed countries. The homicide 
rate for males between 15 and 24 years of age in the U.S. is 
28 times higher than the rate in Germany, 15 times higher 
than in Australia and 10 times higher than.in Canada (World 
Health Statistics Annual, 1994) . On average, the homicide 
rate in the United States is .3 to 4 times greater for white 
young people and 7 to 8 times higher for black youth than 
the homicide rate in other developed countries (Center for 
Disease Control, 1994) . The firearm mortality rate in the 
United States is 14. 24 per 100, 000, significantly greater 
than the rate of 0. 13 in Asia (Powell & Dahlberg, 1998) . 
One of the reasons it is easy to underestimate the 
seriousness of community violence is that most of the people 
discussing issues of community violence live in safe 
neighborhoods. As noted by William Thomas, attitudes 
influence social institutions and the resulting actions 
(1923) . It is important that people discussing community 
violence give voice to people that are impacted by high 
levels of community violence. Ongoing high levels of 
community violence are not the norm. In 1995, 84% of the 
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counties in the United States recorded no juvenile murders. 
In 9% of the counties, one juvenile was murdered. Ten 
counties accounted for over a third of the murdered 
juveniles in the United States. Twenty-five percent of all 
known juvenile homicide perpetrators were reported in Los 
Angeles, Chicago, Houston, Detroit, and New York City. A 
closer look at the data isolates certain neighborhoods 
within the counties where the murder rate is highest (U.S. 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 
1997) 
Many children do not live in safe neighborhoods, but 
community violence is not uniformly spread over the United 
States. Public housing developments in Detroit, New York 
and Chicago are home to thousands of children, but some are 
among the highest crime communities in the world. Garbarino 
et al. (1991) state that the magnitude of environmental 
danger in some public housing developments is equaled only 
by the level of community violence in locations involved in 
armed conflict. In a study conducted by the National 
Institute of Justice in 10 high crime inner city schools in 
Illinois, Louisiana, New Jersey, and California, researchers 
reported that one in three males in the tenth grade had been 
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shot at with a gun, stabbed with a knife or otherwise 
injured with a weapon at school or in transit to or from 
school. Furthermore, forty percent of the students reported 
that male relatives carry guns in the community (1995). 
Since the research was not based on probability sampling and 
participation was voluntary, the findings may not be 
representative of the community. The findings do indicate 
that for many of the 1, 591 young people in the study, 
community life is not safe. 
Impact of Community Violence 
The human pain experienced by people due to community 
violence is beyond current measures. The exact costs of 
community violence for medical care, rehabilitation, lost 
jobs, and educational productivity are not known. No 
national registry exists for reporting all gunshot wounds 
caused by assaults. The Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention have collected data on nonfatal gun-related 
injuries from a sample of 91 hospitals in the United States 
since 1992. In their study, little information is available 
about the event or type of weapon used (Zawitz, 1996). In a 
study by Cohen and Miller, the estimate for firearm assault 
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costs for injury and death in the U.S. was $63. 4 billion in 
1992, with costs for medical care, mental health services, 
emergency transport, insurance administration, and police 
services included (1995) . Another estimate for the cost of 
firearm injuries is over $20. 4 billion in costs for 
hospital, medical care, long term disability and premature 
death, with 80% of the cost paid by taxpayer dollars (Rice, 
1993) 
Impacting many children are the neurological and 
developmental consequences of living in an ongoing state of 
fear. Garbarino states that chronic community violence 
requires children to adjust developmentally in order to 
survive (1997) . Friedlander indicates that a great societal 
problem is children being wounded by the trauma of community 
violence. Many are then left with impaired ability to 
maintain effective interpersonal relationships and reduced 
adaptive competence in educational performance and 
employability (1993) . 
Perry states that children are malleable rather than 
resilient, and community violence impacts the neurological 
development of many children (1997) . Studies by Perry 
indicate that the brain organization of children raised in 
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an environment characterized by community violence develops 
a stress-response apparatus that is excessively active and 
reactive. He states that for some children a physical 
change within the child' s brain occurs that results in an 
altered cortical modulation ratio and a resulting 
predisposition to behave in an impulsive, aggressive, 
reactive manner. Furthermore, the neurodevelopmental 
adaptation to the ongoing low level of fear impairs a 
child' s ability to learn in a classroom setting. Sometimes 
this results in Wechsler Intelligence scores that are 
similar to those of children considered learning disabled 
(1997). A methodological weakness of the research is very 
small sample size. Also, there is a scarcity of 
longitudinal studies on the impact of experience on 
neurological development. 
Studies by Pynoos & Eth (1985) and Pynoos (1990) have 
also indicated that children in a violent, chaotic 
environment become hypervigilant with cognitive distortions 
and behavioral impulsivity. The research in this area is 
very limited. Compounding the observance of causal 
relationships between learning difficulties and community 
violence are the often coexisting factors of major poverty 
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and parents' limited occupational success. Research design 
problems in studies of very poor, violent communities are 
addressed later in this paper. 
Psychologically, Riechters and Martinez (1993) , Osofsky 
(1997) , Jenkins and Bell (1997) , and Garbarino and Kostelny 
(1997) consistently report that exposure to violence is 
associated with distress symptoms in both younger and older 
children. Older children's symptoms of distress and 
depression are significantly associated with violent 
activity involving people they know. Their findings 
indicate that most violent activity reported by children 
involves people familiar to them. Research also indicates 
·that psychological distress among high school students is as 
strongly correlated to a family member being victimized as 
to the adolescent personally experiencing victimization, 
regardless of whether the young person witnessed the violent 
incident (Jenkins & Bell, 1994). 
Children 6 through 12 years of age also experience 
distress symptoms related to their parents' violent 
victimizations even though they have not witnessed the 
violent incidents (Dulmus, 1998) . Several researchers state 
that children in violent communities witness many different 
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types of violence with the frequency of exposure to less 
severe types of violence being higher (Fitzpatrick & 
Boldizar, 1993; Richters & Martinez, 1993; Uehara et al. , 
1996). Osofsky indicates that in high crime areas, children 
are taught to sit with their heads below window sills and to 
run or dive when they hear gun shots. Very early in life 
children must also deal with loss and grief related to 
community violence (1993). In addition, Garbarino expresses 
concern for the parents and community adults exposed to 
community violence. Often, they are too frightened,­
preoccupied, or angry to help compensate for risk factors in 
the child' s life. He theorizes that community violence 
often diverts and suppresses the abilities of adults to be 
psychologically available to children (1992) . 
DuRant, Cadenhead, Pendergrast, Slavens and Linder 
(1994) indicate that exposure to violence and victimization 
are the two strongest predictors of future use of violent 
behavior. Elliot' s analysis of the National Youth Survey 
data indicates that the stability of social relationships 
and social contextual factors are the greatest indicators of 
maintaining aggressive-violent behaviors. He suggests that 
factors in the community such as employment and supportive 
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living arrangements impact whether or not young males 
transition into conventional adult roles or maintain 
involvement in violent behavior. Community factors, rather 
than some underlying predisposition for violent behavior, 
are considered the greatest indicators of a life of violent 
behavior. Elliot contends that in some poor neighborhoods, 
the dependence of some young males on gangs and an illicit 
economy makes transition into traditional adult roles very 
difficult. His research also indicates the importance of 
appropriate interventions with children before eleven years 
of age. For children initiating a serious violent offense 
before eleven years of age, 45% continued violent careers 
into their twenties (1994) . 
Research on Community Violence 
Most of the limited research on community violence is 
conducted in areas with high murder rates. As stated by 
Richter and Martinez, although the murder rate has received 
nationwide concern and attention, it represents only a crude 
measure of the day-to day community violence characterizing 
many neighborhoods. In their measure of children' s exposure 
to community violence, they include the child' s experience 
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of witnessing as well as being a victim of shootings, 
assaults and physical threats, (1993) . Most of the studies. 
on community violence occur in high crime areas of Chicago, 
New Orleans, Washington, DC, Denver, and Detroit. Even less 
is known about community violence in public housing 
developments that do not have a high murder rate. The 
levels of community violence in inner city housing 
developments with lower murder rates have not been as well 
investigated as violence levels in areas with higher murder 
rates·. Little is known about the impact of living in a 
moderately violent public housing neighborhood. 
Tolan et al. indicate that there is a major need for 
more studies that can identify which characteristics and 
which indicators in a violent community influence child and 
adolescent development (2003) . 
Definitions of Community Violence 
One problem in defining community violence is that 
there is no consensus regarding a definition of community 
violence. The operational definitions of community violence 
used by various organizations have serious implications 
regarding how much information is available on the scope and 
14 
incidence of community violence. For example, random 
gunfire is sometimes considered a major problem, but gunfire 
is rarely measured. The scope and incidence of random 
gunfire is therefore not known. Crocker and Algina (1986} 
state that before any measurement of a construct can be 
made, it is necessary to establish some rule of 
correspondence between the theoretical construct and 
observable referents that are legitimate indicants of that 
construct. Currently, different definitions of community 
violence use different observable referents as indicants of 
commun�ty violence. 
Friedlander (1993} compares research on community 
violence to family violence research. He indicates that 
until researchers obtain the precision, scope, and data for 
community violence similar to that gained by the National 
Family Violence Survey described by Straus and Gelles (1990} 
it will not be possible to provide baseline data in the 
realm of community violence. Lorion and Salzman (1993} 
expect that with additional research on community violence 
regarding prevalence estimates and ethnographic data, it 
will be possible to organize a taxonomy of violent 
encounters. Garbarino has stated that in order to fully 
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understand the nature of community violence we need a �child 
impact analysis" that addresses all the facets of community 
violence (1991) . 
The most frequently quoted indicant of community 
violence used by researchers is the U. S. Department of 
Justice Uniform Crime Report on violent crime (Garbarino & 
Kostelny, 1997; Richters & Ma�tinez, 1993; and Osofsky, 
1997) . The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) defines violent crime 
as composed of four offenses: murder and nonnegligent 
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated 
assault. All violent crimes also involve force or the 
threat of force (1996) . Certainly this is valuable 
information, but the UCR is making no attempt to define 
community violence. They report statistics on four areas of 
violent crime. Even though UCR statistics are frequently 
used to describe community violence, they are very clear 
about making no attempt to record the composite of all 
violent behaviors in a community. 
Researchers use different operational definitions to 
define community violence. The operational definition used 
by Jenkins and Bell involves observing the actual location 
of violent behaviors and noticing whether people in the 
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community have the opportunity to personally witness the 
activity. For example, in Chicago in 1993, 56% of the 
city' s homicides occurred in a �public way" (e. g. , alley or 
street) . The public nature of this activity makes the 
witnessing of violence more probable and increases a young 
person's chances of being an accidental or random victim 
(1997) . The operational definition used by Richter and 
Martinez includes children' s experience to witnessing as 
well as being a victim of shootings, assaults and physical 
threats (1993) . The indicants studied by the Center for 
Disease Control involved injuries and deaths due to violence 
(1998) . Important to this study is that all definitions of 
community violence include the presence of gunfire. 
Definitions Used in this Study 
The definition of community violence used in this paper 
is heavily influenced by Friedlander' s concern regarding the 
major lack of research on community violence. He states 
that the National Family Violence Survey provides baseline 
prevalence data in the realm of family violence, but a 
similar instrument for community violence is not available 
(1993) .  A definition of community violence that encompasses 
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the entire realm of community violence should include the 
sum of all the components of community violence. The 
definition needs to cover the broad range of actions 
included in community violence. The definition of community 
violence used in this paper is the sum of all human actions 
in a community that harm, potentially harm, or threaten the 
physical well being of any person in the community. 
Operational modifications of the definition, based on 
cultural perspective, are possible. For example, a cultural 
perspective of community violence might exclude arson-elated 
injuries and vehicular homicide as indicators of community 
violence. The definition used in this paper is very broad 
so as not to exclude any components of community violence. 
Components of community violence include but are not limited 
to: 
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• violent crimes reported by the UCR, NCVS, and 
CDC; 
• objective counts of gunfire; 
• acts of intimidation with guns without use of 
gunfire; 
• use of other weapons such as knives, rocks, and 
fists to harm or intimidate; 
• verbal intimidation that threatens the physical 
well being of a person; 
• chemical warfare; 
• biological warfare; 
• pollution used to intentionally harm or 
threaten; 
• verbal reports of human actions that harm, 
potentially harm, or threaten the physical well 
being of a person. 
Two problems with the definition are (a) it does not 
consider whether the acts of violence are intentional, and 
(b) it includes actions that are not traditionally 
considered components of community violence. A related 
problem with the definition of community violence is that 
accepted operational definitions and measures for many of 
the components of community violence do not exist. 
As used by Popkin, a public housing development is 
considered to be a community (1999) . Given the massive 
scope of community violence, this paper will give particular 
emphasis to one aspect of community violence: gunfire in a 
community. 
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Measures of Community Violence 
Basic to the research on the impact of community 
violence in vario�s public housing neighborhoods is an 
accurate measure of the changing levels of community 
violence. As mentioned above, the most frequently quoted 
national measures of community violence are the criminal 
activities reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(Osofsky, 1997; Richters and Martinez, 1993; Garbarino and 
Kostelny, 1997; and Jenkins and Bell, 1997) . The measure 
used by the Center for Disease Control and healthcare 
organizations involves the injuries and deaths reported to 
medical personnel (CDC, 1998) . The exposure to violence 
measure used by the National Institute of Mental Health 
includes self reports by parents and children of their 
personal exposure to community violence. Methodological 
concerns exist in that sizable discrepancies exist between 
parents' and children's reports of community violence 
(Martinez and Richters, 1993) . 
This review analyzes different community violence 
measurement procedures used in public housing and, when 
available, gunfire frequency measures. {See Figure 1. 1) . 
Particular attention is given to the following questions 
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Victimization 
Surveys 
All measures of connnunity 
violence include the 
presence of gunfire. 
Community 
Assessments 
Medical 
Reports 
eunflre 
I 
Uniform 
Crime 
Reports 
Individual 
Family 
Assessments 
Figure 1.1 Measures of Community Violence 
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asked by Messick (1993) and Loevinger (1957) regarding the 
construct validity of measures: how well does the test 
measure the construct being measured; how well does the 
procedure measure something that actually exists; and to 
what extent do the interpretations of the measure correspond 
to what is measured? As suggested by Messick (1993), 
importance is given not just to the responses, but also to 
the persons responding and the context of the measurement. 
This includes factors in the assessment setting and in the 
environmental background. 
Importance of Research on Community Violence 
The importance of becoming more informed about the 
nature of community �iolence has far-reaching implications 
for the practice of social work in inner city settings. 
This is perhaps best clarified by an analogy given by 
Rothery regarding work with families impacted by family 
violence. He states that for years the effects of family 
violence were not addressed when providing family therapy, 
marital counseling or other family services. Most clinical 
wisdom as late as the 1970s dictated that harmful forms of 
domestic violence were in reality quite rare (1993). As a 
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result, domestic violence undoubtedly continued when 
something could have been done to stop some of the assaults. 
Currently, many programs are attempting to address the 
needs of people living in public housing developments. A 
concern is that the needs of a program to provide a certain 
type of service may or may not be meeting the needs of the 
clients served. As indicated by Kissel, changing social 
conditions requires modifications in the way needs are 
addressed (1975) . In order to address the problems of inner 
city violence, service providers need to be informed 
regarding what is actually happening in the day-to-day life 
of the community. Rothery contends that because social 
workers desire to help, they must have data that informs 
their practice regarding what are in reality the most 
helpful methods for dealing with a client' s problem. To not 
gather data that indicates the most effective method for 
dealing with a person' s problem is considered irresponsible, 
inhumane and unethical. For example, a very caring and 
responsive parent may only be offered parenting classes 
because this is what an organization has to offer. Her 
maj or concern is the real, physical danger now facing the 
client and her children. Conversely, social workers might 
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focus their attention and resources on dealing with the 
effects of community violence when the puplic .hqusing . .  ��� -� 
neighborhood where they work actually has a very low level 
of community violence. Quantitative data that informs the 
social worker of the nature of community violence is 
important for their clients as well as for their own safety. 
Tolan et al state that more studies are needed that identify 
which characteristics and indicators of a violent community 
are most influential in impacting child and adolescent 
development (2003) . 
Focus of Literature Review 
As mentioned previously, this review gives particular 
attention to exploring what we know about community 
violence and gunfire levels experienced by children living 
in housing developments. To more fully understand what we 
know about community violence in housing developments, it 
is necessary to look at data from larger communities. 
Often data from housing developments are aggregated with 
data from larger areas. Also, the validity and reliability 
of measures of community violence are reviewed below. 
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Issues related to economic status , gender and race are also 
addressed. 
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CHAPTER I:I 
Measures of Community Violence 
To explore what we know about community violence and 
gunfire in housing developments, this chapter reviews (1) 
the major measurement instruments of community violence and 
(2) research using the measurements. The measures of three 
organizations are reviewed: U. S. Department of Justice, U. S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, and Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention. These instruments primarily 
measure violent crimes, which are one component of community 
violence. 
U . S .  Department of Justice Measures 
The United States Department of Justice has two crime 
measures that are frequently used to describe community 
violence. These two statistical indices attempt to measure 
the nature, magnitude, and impact of crime in the nation. 
In both indices the behaviors measured include murder and 
non-negligent manslaughter, aggravated assaults and other 
assaults. The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) and the National 
Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) use different methods and 
focus on different aspects of crime (U. S. Department of 
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Justice, 1995) . The methodology and focus of each measure 
are reviewed below. Findings related to community violence 
and gunfire are included. Because information from public 
housing developments is aggregated with larger communities, 
specific information regarding public housing is usually 
unavailable. Concerns regarding the construct validity and 
reliability of measures for public housing are also 
addressed. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform 
Crime Report (OCR) 
Description of OCR 
The U. S. Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime 
Reporting Program is a massive data collection program 
collecting information from over 16, 000 city, county, and 
state law enforcement agencies. The main objective of the 
program is to generate a reliable set of statistics for use 
in law enforcement management, operation, and 
administration. Over the years, "the data have become one 
of the country's leading social indicators" (p. 1) . A review 
of articles addressing community violence shows that authors 
frequently list descriptive statistics from the Uniform 
2 7  
Crime Reports. The authors of the 1996 UCR state that the 
American public . . looks �o Uniform Crime Reports for 
'information on fluctuations in the level of crime. 
Criminologists, sociologists, legislators, municipal 
planners, the media and other students of criminal justice 
use the statistics for varied research and planning purposes 
(p .  1 )  • 
The Uniform Crime Report began in 1929 to collect 
information reported to law enforcement agencies on crime. 
The offenses they categorize as Part I offenses are 
aggravated assault, homicide, forcible rape, robbery, 
burglary, larceny-theft, motor vehicle theft, and arson. In 
addition - to Part I offenses, the UCR solicits information on 
all crimes except traffic . violations. Offenses called Part 
II crimes include all offenses not listed as Part I crimes. 
The UCR data are compiled (1) through state-level UCR 
programs in 44 states and the District of Columbia and (2) 
from local law enforcement agencies. Law enforcement 
agencies report crime data to the U. S. Department of Justice 
Federal Bureau of Investigation. The age, sex, and race of 
arrestees are reported by crime category. When state 
agencies do not comply with the UCR reporting requirements, 
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the UCR program may reinstitute direct reporting from law 
enforcement agencies within the state {U. S. Department of 
· -· � Justice, 1997) . 
Sources of Error 
Following are some of the sources of error that impact 
the reliability and validity of the Uniform Crime Report 
data. Many of the sources of error apply only to 
populations experiencing environmental factors such as 
poverty and intimidation. Conditions for the likelihood of 
systematic and random errors are described. 
Inconsistent Data Management System. 
Collection of basic OCR data is an enormous task. 
Information is collected from over 16, 000 law enforcement 
agencies. The front line for collecting information is the 
police officer. The recording of data is only a very small 
portion of their daily duties. · With such a massive number 
of people with different training levels recording data, 
interrater reliability is possibly a concern. The 
consistency of the observations across raters may be of 
interest. 
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Instruments for recording data also vary among 
agencies. Enforcement agencies sometimes compile more 
detailed information than is required, but this is 
frequently not feasible. Although the cost of computers and 
software has decreased, many agencies still have limited 
data management capabilities. According to the National 
Institute of Justice National Assessment Program: 1994 
Survey Results, 2, 500 directors of criminal justice agencies 
indicate that information systems are their highest concern. 
Some agencies still rely on paper and pen. 
Of greatest interest to sheriffs and police chiefs are 
systems to support problem solving and disposition of cases. 
Many believe the current systems lack the ability to analyze 
repeat call analyses or to track progress on problems and 
projects. Most police chiefs and sheriffs report that they 
have court information systems {66. 9 percent) , but 7 9. 5  
percent indicate that the system needs improvement. One 
judge commented that part of the problem is that there has 
been a deluge of computer programs, but many people are slow 
to change. Some respondents are not knowledgeable about the 
capabilities of the computer systems they currently have 
(National Institute of Justice, 1 995) . The concerns 
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expressed by the sheriffs and police chiefs for information 
system needs seem to indicate that many want a better way 
for processing and reviewing the data generated by their 
departments. They want more information about what is going 
on in their jurisdictions. Some respondents even want more 
current information on social resources in their areas. The 
OCR Program does receive data from 16, 000 law enforcement 
agencies; however, the reporting process varies from very 
sophisticated data management systems to agencies struggling 
to compile the most basic data. A uniform data management 
system within the 16, 000 reporting law enforcement agencies 
does not exist. Limited data management capabilities limit 
what is known about violent crime occurring specifically in 
public housing. 
Missing Data. 
As stated by the 1996 Uniform Crime Report {1997) , law 
enforcement agencies report data representing ninety-five 
percent of the United States total population. The OCR 
authors list several reasons for not including approximately 
five percent of the population. For example, Montana's 
estimates for 1995 were not available until after the 
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publication of Crime in the United States 1995. To be 
included in the jurisdictional statistics figures for all 12 
months of a year, law enforcement agencies must submit 
reports before the UCR publication deadlines. Although most 
agencies do submit data to the UCR Program, sometimes the 
data does not cover complete annual periods. Another 
problem is that the Federal Bureau of Investigation deems 
some reports invalid. For example, the aggravated assault 
figures reported in Kentucky for 1994 were not valid. Data 
is considered invalid when it is found that annexations or 
crime reporting procedures are influencing the reported 
level of crime. For purposes of looking at UCR information 
pertaining to housing developments, there is no indication 
that the missing data from the five- percent of the 
population not included by UCR is over-represented by 
residents of public housing developments. 
Underestimated Offense Rates. 
The information from the OCR includes four offenses in 
its operational definition of violent crime: murder and non­
negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and 
aggravated assault. Law enforcement agencies report the 
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numbers of "actual offenses known" to the UCR Program 
regardless of whether anyone is prosecuted or arrested. 
Agency counts do not include complaints determined to be 
false or unfounded (U. S. Department of Justi�e, 1997) . 
One concern is how well the current system is working 
for reporting crimes that occur in housing developments. 
Research is not available on how complaints in public 
housing are determined to be false or unfounded. Judd, 
Smith, and Kidder state that the reliability of measures 
depends on the extent to which independent observers concur 
in their ratings of the same objects or events (1991) . The 
reliability of what is reported to the UCR is a concern when 
the same event is reported in one community as a violent 
offense but is not reported as a violent offense in another 
community. 
Certain assumptions appear to be in existence for the 
reporting system to work with a high degree of reliability. 
A witness or victim needs to assist the officer by reporting 
the crime. Klockars, professor of criminal justice at the 
University of Delaware, further clarifies factors that 
influence what law enforcement agencies report to the 
Uniform Crime Report Program. He states that police reports 
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are subject to many types of discretion. Citizen discretion 
impacts what they report. Police cannot report crimes that 
are not reported to them. Also, some offenders successfully 
conceal crimes that occur. Furthermore, police have 
discretion in what they report. Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly for high crime areas, for crimes that are 
ongoing such as drug dealing, crime report numbers reflect 
more the resources allocated to address the crime than a 
change in the crime rate (1997) . The reliability of UCR 
· data appears to be very high in the majority of 
neighborhoods; however, the accuracy of violent crime data 
representing people living in some public housing is more of 
a concern. Underreporting of violent crime in public 
housing gives an inaccurate picture of the violent crime 
rate. Differential reliability is a concern when the level 
of crime impacts what is reported to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. 
Some possible factors impacting the construct validity 
of UCR data include the discretion of people involved in 
reporting the crime, the impact of officers' fear in 
selecting patrol areas that are less potentially harmful to 
them, the level of resources allocated for solving ongoing 
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crime such as street drug dealing, and the influence . of 
residents' income and political strength in proportional 
allocation of resources to match a particular level of 
community crime. The certain component of discretion 
exercised by citizens and police officers in �igh crime 
communities is that their decisions are complex. Discretion 
of citizens, police, and law enforcement administration are 
complicated factors that are not .well researched. 
The reliability of what is measured by the UCR Program 
in public housing developments is also influenced by the 
discretion of those reporting. Pedhazur and Schmelkin 
(1991) state that reliability refers to the degree to which 
test scores are free from errors of measurement, with 
unsystematic errors varying in unpredictable ways. The 
unpredictable way in which discretion influences what crimes 
are reported is more of a concern in high crime areas than 
in low crime areas. The systematic and random errors of the 
crime data in high-risk areas appear to be higher than the 
errors of data from safer neighborhoods. Differential 
reliability is a problem when crimes that would be recorded 
in safer neighborhoods are not recorded in high crime areas. 
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Community Policing Goals. 
The trend of community policing strategies has the 
potential of altering the accuracy of what UCR measures. 
This very positive attempt to develop law enforcement 
behaviors that assist communities in safety has a different 
emphasis from the traditional approac� of charging people 
with an offense. The emphasis is on problem solving. What 
effect this has on the UCR accurately measuring violent 
activity in communities is still unclear. 
The "National Assessment 1994 Survey Results" indicate 
that the number one research concern of police chiefs and 
sheriffs is to understand what components of community 
policing work. A clear ingredient of the assessment is that 
no one really knows which community policing strategies 
reduce community violence (National Institute of Justice, 
1997 ) .  Community policing measurements of safety perhaps 
need more specific indicators of community safety than are 
provided in UCR measures. Since the emphasis in community 
policing is on problem solving, recording all "actual known 
offenses" may be less of a concern than finding resolutions 
to some problems. Charging people with a crime may be of 
less importance than finding a resolution. This is 
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important work, but measurement of crimes may not follow the 
traditional reporting procedures. Community policing in 
. . . - · -
public housing developments impacts the reliability of what 
is reported to OCR. Community policing appears to be a very 
positive direction for reducing crime; however, the 
priorities of the program may result in lower numbers of 
crimes being reported than actually are occurring. This 
presents a systematic reliability error for the OCR data. 
The influence of community policing creates almost drifting 
definitions of offenses with identifying offenses secondary 
to problem solving. As stated by Crocker and Algina, 
interrater reliability is a concern when observations are 
rated differently by different raters (1986) . 
The OCR provides a wealth of information, but 
clarifying which population groups it most accurately 
represents is complicated. How well the OCR system measures 
violence in regions with high levels of crime and poverty is 
not well understood. According to the National Institute of 
Justice report on witness intimidation, one factor that 
impacts the measure of crime is the presence of a gun in an 
offense. This report indicates that cooperation with law 
enforcement personnel is often problematic when guns are 
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involved in offenses (1994) . According to Joseph 
Shuldiner, "experience has shown public housing residents 
are reluctant to serve as witnesses because of fear of 
reprisals and the inability to relocate away from threats" 
(p. 34, 1994) _. When conditions are present that interfere 
with the standard process of reporting crimes, the 
reliability of the measure is reduced. 
The UCR measurement of violence has been further 
compromised by the findings of the National Crime 
Victimization Survey 1994 which notes the discrepancy 
between crime reported in the survey and the FBI Uniform 
Crime Report. The NCVS data indicates that 58% of the 
violent crimes reported in its survey were not reported to 
the police. For simple assault, 64% of the crimes were not 
reported; for aggravated assault, 48% were not reported to 
police. One assumes that the data from the UCR and the NCVS 
would be more similar. The data suggest a problem with a 
low degree of convergent validity. Numerous factors 
influence which violent crimes are reported to law 
enforcement agencies for measurement in the UCR. The 
validity of UCR data is reduced when the data do not tell us 
accurately the levels of crime actually occurring. The 
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program does provide very important information, but it is 
not a precise measure of violent crime in public housing. 
Differential Reliability of Clearance Rates. 
The OCR Program . considers an offense cleared or solved 
when at least one person is arrested, charged with the 
offense, and turned over to the court for prosecution (U. S. 
2Department of Justice, 1997) . The offense is removed from 
the UCR count if the charge is considered unfounded. As 
stated by Travis, the impact of low clearance rates is to 
lower people's willingness to report crime (1996) . This 
impacts the validity of OCR data. Below are some of the 
clearance rate findings from the OCR 1996 report. 
Unfortunately, specific information regarding crimes in 
housing developments are not routinely recorded. Therefore, 
crimes in housing developments are included within the data 
for larger categories. This following review gives 
particular attention to aggravated assault, assault, and 
murder . 
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Influence of Population Group . 
One category for reporting crimes involves the grouping 
of locations by population groups. (See Table 1) . 
Statisticians group locations by the size of cities, and by 
whether the areas are rural or suburban. A metropolitan 
statistical area (MSA) is defined as an area that includes a 
central city of · at least 50, 000. Rural is defined as being 
outside of a metropolitan statistical area, not under the 
jurisdiction of a city police department, and mostly 
unincorporated. Counties in a metropolitan statistical area 
are designated �suburban. " A suburban area includes (1) 
cities with less than 50, 000 inhabitants and a police 
department and ·c 2 )  unincorporated areas within a MSA. In 
1996, the violent crime offenses reported by all law 
enforcement agencies were 1, 293, 408 with 47. 4 percent 
cleared by arrest. This means that for 613, 075 violent 
offenses, someone was turned over to the court for 
prosecution, and for 680, 332 violent offenses no one was 
charged with the ·offense. Rural county law enforcement 
agencies reported the highest percentage of violent crimes 
cleared by arrest, 62. 3 percent. Clearance rates for 
violent crimes decreased from 62.3 percent to 39. 3 percent 
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Table 1 .  UCR Offenses ·Known and Percent Cleared by Arrest and 
Population Group, 1996 
Population Violent 
Group crime 
Rural Counties 
Offenses known 51, 466 
Percent cleared 62. 3 
129 Cities, 50, 000 
to 294, 999 
Offenses known 
Percent cleared 
Population Group 
15 Cities, 500, 000 
to 999, 999 
Offenses known 
Percent cleared 
9 Cities, 
1, 000, 000 and over 
Offenses known 
Percent cleared 
155, 554 
47. 9  
Violent 
crime 
126, 364 
39.3 
27 2, 260 
4 1 . 3 
Murder and 
non-negligent 
manslaughter 
1, 042 
7 9. 3  
1, 846 
7 3.3 
Murder and 
non-negligent 
manslaughter 
1, 765 
54. 7 
3, 397 
63.1 
Aggravated 
assault 
41, 286 
65. 0 
90, 780 
58.3 
Aggravated 
assault 
64, 005 
52. 1  
136, 687 
54.6 
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Table 1 .  continued 
Population Violent Murder and Aggravated 
Group crime non-negligent assault 
manslaughter 
Total 
11, 008 agencies 
Offenses known 1, 293, 408 15, 487 775, 204 
Percent cleared 47. 4 66. 9 58. 0  
as population size increased to 999, 999 citizens. The 
authors of the report state that the clearance rate is much 
higher for some crimes against persons because law 
enforcement agencies devote more intensive investigative 
effort to those types of offenses. 
The data suggest that one is more apt to be a victim of 
violent crime in a city with a population over 1, 000, 000 and 
that the likelihood of clearing the offense is lower, only 
4 1. 3  percent. The data indicate that violent crime is least 
likely to be cleared in a city with a population between 
500, 000 and 999, 999 with a 39. 3 percent clearance rate. 
Having cases solved does appear to be more of a problem in 
mid to large cities than in small cities or rural areas. 
The impact of a low clearance rate is to lower people's 
willingness to report crime (Travis, 1996) . The reduction 
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in numbers of people reporting crimes results in decreasing 
the statistical conclusion validity of the measure. Again, 
this is more of a problem in areas with low clearance rates. 
Influence of Geographic Region. 
Law enforcement agencies from different geographic 
regions differ by crimes reported and rates cleared (See 
Table 2) . As indicated by Tonnies, deep social and 
historical differences exist in the way systems of different 
regions interrelate (1955) . The South reports the highest 
rate of murder and non-negligent manslaughter, with a 68.5 
percent clearance, and the Northeast reports the lowest 
rate, with a 70. 7 percent clearance. Information regarding 
repeat victimizations is not given. The UCR data indicate 
that one is somewhat more likely to be a victim of violent 
crime in the South or the West and less likely to be a 
victim in the Northwest or Northeast. 
Influence of a Gun. 
A further review of aggravated assault data indicates a 
much higher rate of clearance by arrest for offenses 
involving fists or knives than offenses involving guns . 
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Table 2 .  UCR Offenses Known and Percent Cleared by 
Geographic Region , 1996 
Geographic region Violent Murder and Aggravated 
crime non-negligent assault 
manslaughter 
West 
Offenses known 388, 725 4, 320 240, 237 
Percent cleared 47. 2 60. 7 58. 4  
Rate per 1, 000 7. 15 . 079 4. 42 
South 
Offenses known 450, 378 6, 343 28 3, 8 39 
Percent cleared 49. 2 68. 5  58. 2 
Rate per 1, 000 6. 8 . 096 4 . 3 
Midwest 
Offenses known 178, 775 2, 158 106, 498 
Percent cleared 45. 6 69. 4 55. 0 
Rate per 1, 000 4.7 . 057 2 . 8  
Northeast 
Offenses known 275, 530 2, 666 144, 630 
Percent cleared 46. 0 70. 7 59. 0 
Rate per 1, 000 5. 7 . 055 3. 0 
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(See Table 3) . For the total population, the clearance rate 
for assaults involving hands, fists, feet, etc. , is 65. 2 
percent; however, the clearance rate for assaults involving 
guns is 41. 9%. Again, clearance rates vary from different 
geographic regions. In rural - areas the clearance rate for 
aggravated assaults using fists, feet, etc. (66. 4 percent) 
is closer to the· clearance rate for aggravated assaults 
involving guns (64. 1 percent) . Cities with populations of 
1, 000, 000 and over report a much greater difference in 
clearance rates. Those cities report a clearance rate of 
64. 7 percent for offenses involving fists, feet, etc. , and a 
clearance rate of 34. 6 percent for aggravated assaults 
involving guns. 
The data indicate that the system is working more 
effectively in solving aggravated assault offenses in rural 
areas than in large cities. Cities with populations between 
100, 000 and 249, 999 also report large differences in 
clearance rates. The clearance rate for aggravated assaults 
using fists, feet, etc. , is 65. 7 percent. The clearance 
rate for aggravated assaults using guns is 30. 6 percent. 
The UCR data indicate that aggravated assaults in cities are 
much less likely solved if guns are involved in the offense. 
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Table 3 .  UCR Aggravated Assaults Known and Presence of 
Wea22n 
Population FireaJ:m. Knife or Other Hands 
group cutting Weapon fists , 
instrument feet , 
etc . 
Rural Counties 
Aggravated 
Assaults 7, 844 5, 7 19 10, 779 16, 944 
Percent cleared 
64. 1 68. 9 61. 3 66. 4 
12 9 Cities, 
50, 000 to 
249, 999 
Aggravated 26, 167 16, 515 33, 370 20, 636 
Assaults· 
Percent cleared 34. 6 64. 5 59. 1 65. 7 
15 Cities, 
500, 000 to 
999, 999 
Aggravated 16, 254 12, 286 25, 205 10, 260 
Assaults 
Percent cleared 47. 3 62. 2 51. 2  50. 1 
9 Cities, 
1, 000, 000 and 
over 
Aggravated 
Assaults 40, 164 27, 162 39, 759 29, 602 
Percent cleared 30. 1 65. 0 64. 6 64. 7 
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Table 3 .  continued 
Population Firearm 
group 
Total 
Aggravated 174, 593 
Assaults 
Percent 41. 9 
cleared 
Knife or 
cutting 
instrument 
134, 546 
6 4 . 7  
Other Hands 
weapon fists , 
feet , etc . 
251, 263 219, 377 
58. 1 65. 2 
In regard to Messick's question regarding factors in the 
assessment setting that impact the construct validity, a low 
clearance rate is a factor. People are less likely to 
report a crime when the clearance rate is low. Low 
clearance rates and the impact of intimidation in public 
housing are explored in the next section. 
Influence of Public Housing. 
Informat ion provided by the National Institute of 
Justice report on "Preventing Gang and Drug-Related Witness 
Intimidation" indicates that the clearance rate in public 
housing is lower than that for the rest of a city (1996) . 
Jeremy Travis, the Director of the National Institute of 
Justice, states that many prosecutors and police officers 
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express frustration with their inability to investigate and 
prosecute many cases successfully. Key witnesses refuse to 
provide critical evidence or to testify because of fear of 
retaliation by defendants or their friends and family. This 
adversely affects th� j ustice system' s functioning and 
simultaneously erodes public confidence in the government's 
ability to protect people (1996) . This also lowers the 
construct validity of the UCR. The Messick question 
regarding how well the test measures the construct being 
measured is important in this regard : The number of crimes 
reported is not valid due to some witnesses' refusal to 
provide critical information. The actual number of violent 
crimes is· higher than what is actually reported. No one 
knows how much higher the crime rates would be if victims 
and witnesses provided all the needed information for crimes 
to be counted in the OCR. Witnesses' refusal to provide 
critical information becomes a source of systematic error 
for the OCR. 
As indicated by Jeremy Travis, the "fear of 
retaliation" factor influences the reporting of crime far 
more in housing developments than in suburban or rural areas 
(1996) . The validity of OCR data from public housing 
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developments is much more influenced by fear of retaliation 
than data from suburban and rural areas. The crime rates 
listed in public housing developments are frequently 
moderate to high, but in reality the crime rates are often 
higher than what is recorded. This is very important for 
realistically addressing the level of community crime and 
its impact on children' s growth and development. 
The National Institute of Justice lists the following 
factors in witness. intimidation : 
• violence is a part of the iri tial crime; 
• the witness has a personal connection to the 
accused; 
• the witness lives near the defendant; 
• the witness is vulnerable (e. g. , the victim is 
elderly) . 
The report continues that people living in gang-dominated 
neighborhoods frequently fall into more than one category, 
which increases their likelihood of exposure to intimidation 
(1996) . The factor of vulnerability appears to have an 
impact on some people who live in public housing communities 
that are dominated by gangs. Vulnerability is a factor for 
children, the poor, and the uneducated when dealing with 
49 
violent offenders. High poverty and high concentration of 
children are frequently characteristics of public housing 
developments. Goering et al. compared the income of public 
housing households with other households within the same 
census tract. The average income for homes in public 
housing was approximately $7, 400, and the average income of 
other homes in the census tract was $21, 000 (1994) . Also, 
44% of public housing households include children, and the 
elderly comprise 35 % of the households {Holzman, 1996) . 
Research regarding factors that influence the relationship 
between being a child or parent in a high crime neighborhood 
and interfacing with law enforcement agencies would be 
important for improving the reliability of crime reporting. 
Much of the information expressing concern about victim 
intimidation is from a National Institute of Justice study 
involving 2, 500 directors of criminal justice agencies 
(1995) . No one knows the extent of witness intimidation 
because of very limited research conducted in this area 
{National Institute of Justice, 1996) . A 1994 survey of 192 
prosecutors indicated that intimidation of witnesses and 
victims was a major problem for 51 percent of the 
prosecutors in counties with populations greater than 
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25, 000. Thirty percent considered intimidation to be a 
moderately serious problem. In counties with a population 
between 50, 000 and 250, 000, 43 percent listed intimidation 
as a major problem and 25 percent listed it as a moderately 
serious problem (Webster, 1995 ) . The Uniform Crime Report 
cannot function as a valid measure of violent crimes when 
victim and/or witness intimidation results in crime not 
being reported. Again, the validity of the report is 
decreased in that the numbers of crimes reported is reduced 
due to intimidation. This appears to primarily be a 
measurement problem in some areas with concentrated poverty 
such as public housing developments. 
The increase in victim intimidation is not fully 
understood. Possible explanations listed in the National 
Institute of Justice report on intimidation include the 
following: 
• defendant s are younger than in the past ; 
• they appear to have a profound lack of respect for 
people in authority: 
• they often feel powerless and socially inadequate ; 
• firearms are readily available; 
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• increased penalties imposed on people convicted of 
violent crime increases the stakes of a prosecution 
(Ramsey, 1996) . 
A major component of witness security programs is the 
management of the witness. Law enforcement personnel are 
cautioned not ·to guarantee security to witnesses because of 
liability concerns. Safety is a problem. The witness or 
victim is sometimes relocated. The presence of fear among 
witnesses or victims does raise questions involving the 
risks involved in reporting crime in high risk 
neighborhoods. Sometimes victims must decide if reporting a 
violent crime is worth living in increased fear and/or 
relocating to a different neighborhood. For most people 
living in the United States, the traditional system of 
reporting a violent crime increases one' s sense of safety. 
The crime reporting system appears to work much less 
effectively for citizens living in some high crime areas. 
Some areas for further research in public housing 
developments include: 
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• the impact of intimidation on traditional crime 
reporting; 
• crime reporting and recording techniques that reduce 
or eliminate intimidation; 
• officer motivation in high crime neighborhoods; 
• specialized officer support and incentives for 
officers working in dangerous neighborhoods; 
• community policing techniques that reduce fear in 
witnesses and victims; 
• alternative police and mental health techniques that 
increase neighborhood safety in high crime areas. 
Trends in Violent Crime 
Influence of Age. 
In exploring what we know about community violence, the 
UCR data suggests certain trends. Again, information 
regarding housing developments is usually aggregated with 
larger communities. Trends indicated by population group 
s i ze, age, race and gender are critiqued below . Violent 
crime rates are compared for the years between 1987 and 
1996. 
The UCR data indicate that age is an important factor 
in crime rates. The data for years between 1987 and 1996 
indicate substantial increases in murder and non-negligent 
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manslaughter among persons less than 18 years of age. 
Table 4). The number of persons under the age of 18 
(See 
arrested for murder or non-negligent manslaughter increased 
by 50. 5 percent from 1, 355 to · 2, 036. Following a similar 
trend, the arrest rate for aggravated assault for the total 
population increased by 43. 1 percent, but the arrest rate 
for people under the age of 18 incre�sed by 70. 2 percent. 
It is important to also clarify, however, that persons over 
18 years of age commit the majority of crimes. In 19961 
Table 4.  UCR Total Arrest Trends for Age, 1987-1996 
Under 1 8  Years of Age 
Offenses 1 987  1 9 96 Percent 1 987  
Change 
Murder and 1 , 355  2 , 039  +50 . 5  1 2 , 6 1 1  
Non-
negligent 
Manslaughter 
Aggravated 2 9 , 7 0 5  50 , 5 60 +7 0 . 2  2 1 1 , 7 93 
Assaults 
Other 7 7 , 4 1 5  15 4 , 7 62 +9 9 . 9 4 5 9 , 1 1 2  
Assaults 
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18 Years of Age 
and Over 
1 9 96 Percent 
Change 
1 1 , 4 07 -9 . 5  
2 95 , 0 8 4  +3 9 . 3  
7 1 8 , 2 68 + 5 6 . 4  
for example, 15 percent of the people arrested for murders 
and non-negligent manslaughters were under the age of 18 
with 85 percent over 18 years of age . In summary, the 1995-
1996 UCR data indicate arrest rates for people under 18 
increased more than for people over 18, but the majority of 
violent crimes are committed by people over 18 years of age. 
The 1995-1996 UCR data �lso indicates that age is an 
important factor in crime rates. (See Table 5) . For murder 
and non-negligent manslaughter, people less than 25 years of 
age account for 56. 2 percent of all arrests. For aggravated 
assaults, 40. 0 percent of arrests are of people under 25 
years of age, and for other assaults 40 . 3  percent . of arrests 
are of people under 25 years of age . For all crimes the 
arrest rate declined by 4. 1 percent in the 40-44 year age 
group, and further declined 3. 2 percent in the 45-49 age 
group. As mentioned previously, the UCR is a listing of the 
crimes reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
Fortunately, families and child-oriented institutions have 
the major responsibility for dealing with violent acts of 
young children. The data for children under 10 years of age 
are therefore not a valid indication of violent acts 
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Table 5 .  UCR Violent Crime Arrests , Distribution by Age , 
1996  
Age Percent Distribution 
Under 10 . 2  
10-14 5. 3 
15-19 22. 7 
20-24 17. 7 
25-29 14. 8 
30-34 13. 7 
35-39 11. 0 
40-44 6. 7 
45-49 3. 7 
50-54 1. 8 
55-59 . 9 
60-64 . 5 
65 and over . 7  
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committed by young children. This only indicates that 
appropriate sources of data for young children are the more 
traditional institutions that nurture, educate, and guide 
children. 
Influence of Gender. 
Another violent crime factor strongly indicated by the 
1996 UCR data is gender. For violent crimes, 84.9 percent 
of the people arrested in 1996 were male and 15. 1 percent 
were female. For aggravated assaults, 17.9 of the people 
arrested were female and 8 2.1 were male. Although males are 
arrested more frequently, the arrest rate for females is 
increasing at a faster rate than for males. The 1987-1996 
UCR data indicate that the female arrest rate for violent 
crime increased 118. 1 percent, whereas the male arrest rate 
increased 52.7 percent. For the 1995-1996 data, the female 
arrest rate for violent crime increased . 3  percent and the 
male rate decreased 6.9 percent. 
The UCR data from 1995 - 1996 indicated an overall 
decline in violent crimes. For murder and non-negligent 
manslaughter, the number of people arrested declined 10. 5 
percent to 13, 937. The rate for persons under 18 declined 
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14. 4 percent to 2, 109. For aggravated assault, the total 
rate of arrests declined by 2. 8 percent to 368, 802. The 
rate for persons under 18 declined by 4. 0 percent to 53, 877 
aggravated assaults. For the total population the rates of 
other assaults increased by . 4  percent to 907, 422. The 
assault rate for persons under 18 increased 3 percent to 
159, 8 36. Caution is needed when interpreting the 1996 
trends indicated in UCR data. As indicated by the National 
Institute of Justice in their "Annual Report to Congress 
1996, " the decline in crime from 1995 to 1996 was positive 
news, but the downturn from a record high was unevenly 
distributed across American communities. While violent 
crime rates have declined for most age groups, teens 
continue to have the highest rate of victimizations 
including homicide {1997) . 
Influence of Race. 
The UCR data regarding race is perhaps the most complex 
in terms of factors that influence crime rates. The UCR 
indicates that the murder and nonnegligent manslaughter 
arrest rate for black people is 54. 9 percent of the total 
rate. For aggravated assault, whites comprise 59. 6 percent 
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and black people account for 38. 1  percent of people 
arrested. For other assaults, 62. 4 percent of the people 
arrested are white and 38. 1 percent of the people are black. 
Elliot (1994) states that for continuing in a violent 
lifestyle, "where one is living may be as important as 
whether one is working or livin9 with a partner, " (p. 17) . 
Factors in the environment included employment 
possibilities, discrimination, poverty, supportive family, 
and the presence of an illicit economy. In the material 
presented in the National Crime Victimization Survey 1994, 
people who are young, black and male are considered the most 
vulnerable to violent crimes. This survey indicated that 
the chances of being a victim of a violent crime were 1 in 9 
for black males between the ages of 12 and 15 years of age 
compared to 1 in 196 for people over 65. The likelihood of 
victimization increased if a person lived in a household 
with an income of less than $15, 000. 
The implications of the data lead to a variety of 
research questions regarding how the traditional security 
system can better fit the needs of people living in poor, 
black, urban communities. Community policing, in some 
situations, is attempting to increase trust and belief that 
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the law enforcement system is capable of addressing the 
safety needs of people living in public housing 
developments. Research does not yet have any clear answers 
on how to address the very important issue of goodness of 
fit between the public housing's safety needs and the law 
enforcement system. 
Michael Tonry, School of Law, University of Minnesota, 
speaking at a National Institute of Justice Research in 
Progress Seminar, stated that "in every country, crime and 
incarceration rates for some minority groups greatly exceed 
those for the majority. Perhaps most importantly, there are 
comparable disparities both for racial and ethnic minorities 
and for some that are not 'visible' minorities" (p. 1, 
1997) . He further states that stereotyping and cultural 
behaviors of minority groups often work to their 
disadvantage. Often offenders of a subculture share similar 
patterns of dress, speech, socioeconomic backgrounds, and 
places of residence and recreation. In the United States, 
young black men are victimized when people assume that 
individuals with similar characteristics are likely to be 
offenders (1997) . 
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Influence of Childhood. 
Although the UCR is a vast resource of data for crimes 
involving adults, it provides very little information 
regarding assaults among children. Law enforcement 
agencies traditionally leave the handling of violent 
behavior among young children to their families and the 
social agencies that care for them. The UCR data do not 
include information regarding how often children under 12 
are victimized by the violent acts of other children. 
Children who are victims of violent acts live in a three­
tier system where discretion is exercised regarding 
whether to tell an adult, whether the adult will report 
the offense, and whether law enforcement personnel will 
consider responding to the offense congruent with their 
job responsibilities. The UCR does not attempt to measure 
the violent victimizations of children going to and from 
school, playing outside, etc. , unless the offense is 
reported to an adult who reports the offense to the 
police, who in turn files a petition . The violent 
behavior of young children is generally considered to be 
the responsibility of their families or social 
organizations. For example, children under 10  account for 
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. 2  percent of all people arrested for violent crime. This 
is not a negative regarding law enforcement agencies or 
the UCR, but a clarification of boundaries. 
The lack of law enforcement agencies' involvement with 
children indicates the need for families and social 
agencies to assume more responsibility for children's 
behaviors that reduce community safety . Most law 
enforcement agencies are not equipped to deal 
constructively with the needs of young children . 
According to Fielding, the trends toward law enforcement 
agencies stiffening penalties and trying children as 
adults fail to reduce juvenile crime {1997) . Champion 
states that waivers to try children as adults function 
more as a cosmetic response to public concern than as a 
viable solution to reducing violence {1989) . Law 
enforcement agencies lack resources and alternative 
interventions for children . This perhaps clarifies the 
need for children's organizations to also address 
community violence. 
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OCR Summary 
In review, the OCR provides a wealth of information 
regarding violent crime, but practitioners and researchers 
must not assume the reports provide more information than 
is indicated. Some factors addressed above that limit the 
validity and reliability of the OCR data in public housing 
developments include: 
• discretion in reporting crime; 
• fear of repercussions if a crime is reported; 
• presence of a firearm in the offense; 
• goodness of fit between the person experiencing the 
crime and traditional law enforcement strategies; 
• age of victim' s offender 
Again , as stated by Richters and Martinez, crime rates 
represent only "a crude index of the day-to-day community 
violence that characterizes many neighborhoods throughout 
American cities" {p. 7 ,  1993) . For people living in public 
housing developments , the OCR gives us information 
regarding what is reported to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation. This is important information , but it 
provides only a partial view of the behaviors that comprise 
community violence in public housing developments. Also , 
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the crime data from urban public housing tends to be 
combined with other inner city areas. 
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) 
Description of NCVS 
In the review of OCR data above, frequent comparisons 
and contrasts with the National Crime Victimization Survey 
data have been made. The National Crime Victimization 
Survey (NCVS) was instituted in 1972 as a complement to the 
Uniform Crime Report. The survey provides data on victims, 
crime incidents, and trends from the victims' perspective. 
One concern frequently mentioned in reports by the National 
Institute of Justice is that crimes are frequently not 
reported to law enforcement agencies. Approximately 54. 3% 
crimes of violence reported in the NCVS are not reported to 
police. The NCVS provides another measure of crimes in the 
United States by collecting victimization information from 
a sample of approximately 80, 000 people from about 43, 000 
households. It is the second largest ongoing household 
survey in the country (NCVS, 2001) . 
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The process for administering the NCVS begins with the 
U.S. Bureau of the Census randomly selecting a sample from 
a rotating panel of all households. All age-eligible 
individuals in the selected households become part of a 
panel. Every six months respondents are interviewed for 
three consecutive years. An exception is made to use proxy 
interviewing instead of direct interviewing for the 
following cases: incapacitated persons, individuals absent 
from the household during the entire field-interviewing 
period, and 12-and 13-year-old persons when a knowledgeable 
household member insists they not be interviewed dire·ctly. 
For people who have telephones, the first and fifth 
interviews are in-person interviews and the rest are by 
telephone. For people without telephones, all interviews 
are face-to-face. Many of the questions can be answered by 
"yes" and "no" responses in order for people to respond 
more freely on the telephone when they are in the presence 
of others (NCJRS, 1994) . 
Increased Reliability of the NCVS 
According to the 1999 NCVS, 62. 4% of the crimes 
reported on the survey are not reported to police. Crime 
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report rates vary from 14% to 95%. Only 14% of thefts 
under $50 are reported, but 95% of car thefts are reported 
to police. For crimes of violence, 54. 3% of the crimes 
reported on the NCVS were not reported to police. In 
addition, of the crimes of violence reported to police, 
60. 4% of the crimes did not result in a police officer 
taking a police report. Stated differently, 45. 7% of the 
crimes of violence reported in the NCVS were reported to 
police. Of the 45. 7% of violence crimes reported to the 
police, 39. 6% of the crimes resulted in police· data 
recorded in the UCR � The NCVS data indicate that 18. 1% of 
the crimes of violence recorded in their data are included 
in the UCR data (2001) . Two major strengths of the NCVS 
are (1) recording offenses that are reported to police but 
not reported to the UCR, and (2) recording 19. 8% of the 
offenses reported to the NCVS but not reported to police 
because of personal or private reasons (2001) . 
The NCVS also has a more systematic data collection 
system. In contrast to the UCR, the NCVS is administered 
by people whose jobs are to administer the NCVS. Gathering 
informat�on for the UCR is a small part of the duties of 
officers from over 16, 000 law enforcement agencies. In 
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addition, NCVS field representatives usually reside in the 
area in which they interview. The race and ethnicity of 
the representatives generally match the local population. 
Sources of Error 
Following are some of the sources of error that impact 
the reliability and validity of the National Crime 
Victimization Survey. As with the UCR, sources of error 
are more apt to occur in populations experiencing poverty 
and intimidation. Conditions for the likelihood of 
systematic and random errors are described below. 
Underestimated Offense Rates. 
A concern listed in the 1999 NCVS is the tendency of 
victims to not report crimes committed by offenders who are 
not strangers. Secondly, the NCVS reports that among some 
groups, crimes which contain elements of assault could be a 
part of everyday life. They are therefore forgotten or not 
considered important enough to mention to a survey 
interviewer. Also, although the intent of the survey is 
only to gather information, some may consider it safer not 
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to reveal information. Such recall problems result in an 
understatement of the actual rate of assault (2001) . 
The process of establishing trust for a NCVS interview 
is a complicated factor. According to Popkin et al. , 
respondents in public housing frequently do not acknowledge 
victimizations. An unwritten rule within some public 
housing is to "mind your own business" and not talk about 
victimizations that occur (1999) . 
Certain assumptions exist for the NCVS to work. People 
· need to report their victimizations. A problem related to 
differential validity may exist if people in high crime 
areas do not accurately report to the interviewers. Factors 
of intimidation may still be in existence. Why repeatedly 
answer questions from a 13-page survey and a 2 1  page 
incident report when trust and intimidation are personal 
factors? The assumption is that respondents accurately 
answer survey questions every 6 months for three years. The 
impact of living in chaotic or high crime areas on NCVS 
responses is not known. Also, what impact does the presence 
of a gun in a crime and fear of reprisal have on the 
accuracy of information reported? A related question is the 
impact on males of being interviewed by female 
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representatives. Only about 10% of the NCVS representatives 
are male, and this perhaps has some impact on the quality of 
information given by male respondents. Data are not 
presently available to answer these questions. 
In keeping with the focus of this paper on measuring 
community violence in public housing, the NCVS gives limited 
information on community violence specifically in public 
housing. Until recently, a box was not available to record 
whether or not a person lived in public housing. No 
information regarding type and design of the public housing 
is available. HUD has recently developed a victimization 
survey based on the NCVS that is specifically for people 
living in public housing. This is discussed in detail in 
the HUD section of this paper. 
Missing Data. 
Iri 1999 the NCVS response rate was 93 % for households 
and 89% for persons within households. A household non­
interview adjustment is made for non-responses at the 
household level by inflating the weight assigned to 
interviewed households with similar income, race, and 
ethnicity. A problem exists that homes with similar 
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incomes, race, and ethnicity may vary dramatically regarding 
violent victimization. Also, as suggested by Holzman (1994) 
and Popkin et al. (1999) , living in public housing is a 
major factor in not reporting victimizations . 
Similarly, nonresponses within a household are dealt 
with by inflating the weight assigned to the interviewed 
persons in the household. Again, Holzman (1996) has 
indicated that victimization levels are higher with self­
reports than when someone speaks for another person. 
The implication of not interviewing children under 12 
years of age impacts what we know about victimization in 
children's lives. Richters and Martinez (1993) indicate 
that children report a higher level of victimization with a 
self-report than when parents report for them. Also most of 
the questions in the NCVS only address victimizations for 
people 12 years and older. The implication of this is that 
little is known about the actual levels of victimizations 
experienced by children. The NCVS data does indicate that 
the very highest rates of victimization are for black males 
and females in the youngest group for which data is 
recorded, the 12-15 year age group. The rate for black 
females is reported as 127 . 5  per 1, 000 persons in this age 
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group. For black males the rate · is 91. 8 compared with an 
85. 6 rate for white males and 50. 3 rate for white females. 
The black femaie rate is 57. 1 in the 20-24 age group. In 
addition, young people in the 12-19 age group were the least 
likely to report violent victimizations to police, only 
30. 2%. The data we have indicate a strong need to be more 
fully aware of the victimizations of young people under 12 
years of age. 
Another area of missing data involves counting data 
from series victimizations. A series victimization is 
defined as six or more similar but separate crimes which the 
victim is unable to recall individually or describe in 
detail to an interviewer. Since 1980, series crimes are 
counted as a single victimization. The 1979 NCVS report 
shows that victimization counts and rates were higher in 
1979 when the series crimes were added. A separate category 
for series victimizations is included, but information about 
series crimes is excluded from the count of individual 
victimizations . For areas where repeat victimizations are 
higher, this is important information when trying to 
understand patterns and hopefully, solutions to problems. 
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Findings 
Regarding community violence in public housing, some 
NCVS factors that also are relevant to people living in 
public housing include economic level, age, and location of 
a violent victimization. The economic level of people 
living in public housing is usually low due to the 
guidelines of public housing. NCVS data related to this low 
economic level indicates that the highest violent 
victimization level (71 per 1000) is recorded for people 
with yearly incomes less than $7, 500. The violent 
victimization rate declines as income increases with a 30.7 · �  -
rate listed for people with incomes of $75, 999 or more. 
Age is another factor in high violent victimization 
rates. People between the ages of 12 and 15 are three times 
more likely to be violently victimized than people between 
35 and 49 years of age (Rand, 1998) . In addition, repeat 
victims are least apt to notify police and repeat 
victimizations are highest in areas with the highest crime 
levels (Travis, 1996) . 
NCVS data indicates that most violent victimizations 
occur in public places. For crimes of violence, the NCVS 
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indicates that only 5% occurred inside a home or lodging. 
Forty percent occurred within one mile of the victim' s home, 
26% occurred over one mile but less than five miles from 
home, 24% occurred between five and fifty miles from home, 
and 5% occurred 50 or more miles from the victims home. 
The implication is that people are most apt to be 
victims of violent crime if they are very poor, young, and 
outside their homes. Many of these factors apply to 
residents of public housing but more precise measures of 
community violence in public housing are needed. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention' s  Recommended 
Measures (CDC} 
Since the early 1980' s the Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention have supported arid promoted a public health 
approach to violence in the United States. Activities of 
CDC are based on two fundamental principles: (1) policies, 
interventions, and programs for preventing violence must be 
firmly grounded in science ; and (2) full participation of 
communities is necessary for the development of a sense of 
ownership for the problems of violence. Since 1992, CDC has 
been funding projects to further develop the knowledge base 
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of information regarding violence (Mercy, Thornton, & 
Crawford, 1996) . 
As stated by Powell et al. , individually oriented 
strategies are more common than strategies directed toward 
communities. One concern is that CDC funding for 
individual-level interventions is easier to obtain, 
resulting in a shortage of community level interventions. A 
major reason for the limited number of community level 
studies is that the power of studies to establish 
statistically significant differences between comparison 
groups and an intervention is less than the power of 
comparably sized projects with individual randomization 
(1996) . In keeping with the public health direction, Powell 
et al. indicate that a future direction for research is to 
examine variables that lead to positive community changes in 
violence levels (1996) . Satcher et al. further indicate 
that individually oriented strategies should definitely be 
continued, but that this work must be complemented by 
strategies designed to reduce violence exposure at the 
family, peer, community, and societal levels (1996) . This 
emphasis on research is in keeping with the focus of this 
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paper regarding the need to address the variables of 
community violence. 
Suggested Measures 
The Center of Disease Control has recently published a 
list of suggested measures for assessing violence-related 
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors among youths (1998) . 
Following is a review of measures suggested by the CDC that 
might be helpful in measuring variables of community 
violence. Two measures are listed for assessing young 
people's individual levels of exposure to violence, and four 
measures are listed as environmental assessments of the 
quality of neighborhood life. Measures of reliability are 
given for most measures. 
"Children's Exposure to Community Violence" 
The "Children's Exposure to Community Violence" measure 
by Richer & Martinez consists of 12 items. The items 
include 12 statements and respondents have a choice of four 
answers: (1) never, (2) once or twice, (3) a few times, and 
(4) many times. A concern mentioned by Holzman is that the 
assessments of adults need to be repeated again after six 
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months. Adults tend to "telescope" violent events and 
include events that occurred outside of the time frame 
indicated (1999) . The impact of time on what children 
report i� a concern regarding the validity of the 
information that is reported by children for a particular 
time frame. The concern that test-retest reliability was 
not established was a concern listed by Richters and 
Martinez in a National Institute of Mental Health study 
conducted in Washington, DC. They indicate, however, that 
they had confidence in the ability of children to provide 
useful estimates of violence exposure due to significant 
levels of pairwise agreement and because of details of 
exposure volunteered by respondents in face-to-face 
interviews (Richters & Martinez, 1993) . Richters and 
Martinez list the target group for the assessment as 
African-American males between the ages of 12 and 16. The 
internal consistency is listed by CDC as . 84. CDC states 
that exposures to violence through sounds and sights are 
addressed. The one statement regarding sound is "I have 
heard guns being shot. " Ten statements refer to what the 
young person has seen and one statement asserts "my house 
has been broken into, " (CDC, 1998) . 
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A concern regarding the measure of violence exposure 
through sounds is that more specific information is needed. 
The impact on children of hearing gunshots nightly is 
perhaps different from the impact of hearing many shots in 
one isolated event. The measure would not distinguish those 
neighborhoods that have a very high frequency of gunfire 
from those having significantly less gunfire. The measure 
gives some important information regarding violence in the 
community, but it is not a precise measure of sound or sight 
experiences that negatively impact the safety of people 
living in an area. 
"Victimization Scale" 
The "Victimization Scale" measure for middle school 
students by Nadel, Spellmann, Alvarez-Canino et al. , (1996) 
is also listed by CDC. One problem is that reliability of 
the instrument has not been established. The assessment 
includes 1 35 items about violent activity at school, outside 
of school, in the neighborhood, and at home. One point made 
by CDC is that the field of assessing violept behaviors is 
new and very few standardized instruments with established 
population norms are available (CDC, 1998) . The 
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victimization scale appears to be in the earlier stages of 
its development as a measure of the construct victimization. 
Environmental Assessments 
All four environmental assessments of quality of 
neighborhood are normed to urban residents eighteen years of 
age and older. None of the assessments specifically 
measures community violence. They do address the important 
area of neighborhood cohesion. Bolland suggests that lack 
of neighborhood cohesion is negatively correlated with high 
levels of community violence (1998) . 
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CHAPTER III 
Public Housing History , Problems , and Community Violence 
Research 
The following section will look at (1) the history and 
current trends in public housing, (2) the research and 
measurement of community violence and gunfire in public 
housing, and (3) the problems encountered in HUD's attempts 
to measure community violence in public housing. 
Having reliable, valid information about the safety of 
community life in public housing is very important in that 
the growth and dev�lopment of many children are affected. 
Secondly, millions of Federal dollars are spent on public 
housing. This section also clarifies the need for a 
reliable instrument that measures community violence or at 
least components of community violence. Material also 
indicates the need to reliably measure gunfire in public 
housing. 
History of U . S .  Public Housing 
The public housing program began in 1937 with the 
passage of the United States Housing Act. The legislation 
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authorized the formation of public housing authorities with 
each agency retaining ownership of its public housing· 
property. The federal government does not own public 
housing authorities. The direction of public housing 
changed when the 1949 Housing Act provided housing for 
families needing help with rent. In 1969, the emphasis 
shifted to federal funds providing rent subsidies for low­
income families choosing to live in public housing. This 
financial shift in public housing resulted in public housing 
authorities changing from economic self-sufficiency to 
dependence on federal funds for a substantial amount of 
housing authorities' budgets (Holzman, 1996) . The number of 
public housing authorities has grown to 3, 224. U.S. public 
housing units are home to 3. 3 million people. Thirty-five 
percent of the residents are elderly, and 44% of the 
households include children (Bolland & Mccallum, 1999) . 
Problems in Public Housing 
Materials from HUD are often very candid regarding 
problems in public housing and the attempts being made to 
address these problems. HUD does not presume to have all 
the answers. An example of this is the evaluation of the 
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HUD Urban Initiatives Anti-Crime Program. The HUD-sponsored 
evaluation states that the sites selected for the program 
were not the areas most in need of the program, and the 
program was created without adequate information about the 
nature and extent of crime in public housing. The report 
further states that the centralized control of the program 
creates violations of local concerns and intolerable delays. 
Some of the problems in public housing mentioned in the HUD 
report on transforming public housing include: (1) it 
concentrates the very poor; (2) it creates concentrated 
high-poverty neighborhoods; (3} federal micro management 
aggravates many problems; and (4} market discipline does not 
apply to public housing (Pate, 1984) . Although involvement 
of residents in planning is increasing, historically, 
housing choices for people living in poverty were managed by 
those in authority. Viewed in a light of a capitalistic 
economic order, the opinions of people without money were 
given little value (Weber, 1905) . 
Public housing staff and the residents do not have 
control of all of the factors involved in - improving the 
livability of public housing. The direction of moving 
people out of poor neighborhoods to low cost housing in 
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middle and upper income neighborhoods is often met with 
resistance from the targeted neighborhoods (HUD, 1991) . In 
a report by the Advisory Commission on Regulatory Barriers 
to Affordable Housing, barriers to placing low cost housing 
in various neighborhoods are addressed. Across the country, 
deeply ingrained and widespread problems exist when attempts 
are made to place low income housing in communities. Some 
of the factors listed that tend to keep +ow cost housing and 
its residents out of middle and upper income areas include 
building and zoning regulations and the attitudes of local 
builders, realtors, bankers, public-sector officials, and 
neighborhood residents. The "Not in My Back Yard Syndrome" 
for location of low income housing is an important factor in 
concentrating large numbers of poor people together in poor 
neighborhoods (1991) . Also, race is still a factor in 
placement of public housing. HUD indicates that despite 
efforts to integrate public housing, white public housing 
residents tend to live in predominantly white neighborhoods 
in more affluent areas. The majority of African-American 
public housing residents continue to live in minority 
neighborhoods that have a higher degree of concentrated 
poverty (1995) . In the 1998 HUD report on "The State of the 
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Cities, " the authors state that overt discrimination in 
housing has been driven underground and is much more subtle. 
Present public sector discrimination is more apt to take the 
form of rental terms and conditions that exclude minorities 
(1995) . 
History of Research in Public Housing 
Research oh public housing has been through several 
historical changes. Prior to 19$1, HUD produced a yearbook 
of statistics on public housing authorities and its tenants. 
These data provided research opportunities to better 
understand public housing. The Statistical Yearbook was 
discontinued in 1981, and national level profiles of public 
housing have become almost nonexistent. In Holzman's 
historical account of factors impacting the "information 
gap" of research on public housing, two factors are 
considered of major importance: (1) the discontinuation of 
the HUD Statistical Yearbook; and _ (2) the lack of 
government-sponsored research on crime in public housing 
during the Reagan administration. The resulting reduction 
of public housing research continued into the early 1990's. 
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More recently, the research interest of the 90' s was 
primarily in drug trafficking in large public housing 
authorities. Given that the trend for HUD public housing �s 
smaller developments, the research on large developments is 
not congruent with the research needs for the public housing 
direction of smaller developments (Holzman, 1996) . 
Present Trends in Public Housing 
Presently, the emphasis in public housing is to 
increase the livability of public housing and to increase 
accountability of its programs. In materials on . changing 
the nature of public housing, HUD is searching for answers 
for improving the environment within public housing (1997) . 
One change of direction in the public housing community was 
the demolition of over 3 0, 0 0 0  units within a four year time 
frame ending in 1996 (1997) . The current trend in public 
housing is an emphasis on architectural redesign with 
smaller, less densely configured low-rise and townhouse 
public housing developments. High-rise developments are a 
maintenance nightmare with elevators and plumbing accounting 
for the majority of high-rise maintenance budgets. Limited 
research indicates that big-city low-rise and townhouse 
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public housing are more vulnerable to some crimes (including 
gunfire and gang activity) than high-rise developments. 
Low-rise and townhouse public housing in rural and suburban 
areas do have lower crime rates, but the face of big-city 
crime is not the same (Holzman, 1996, and Zelon et al. , 
1994) . 
Current Research on Public Rousing 
In keeping with the trend of increasing accountability, 
an emphasis on research focusing on what is working well in 
public housing began in 1995. As stated by Stegman, 
Assistant Secretary for the HUD Office of Policy Development 
and Research, the department made an attempt to review 
evaluation research on violence prevention initiatives used 
in public housing developments. The task was to focus on 
programs that were successful in reducing access to 
firearms, conflicts between youth as individuals and as gang 
members, abuse of drugs, and drug trafficking. The 
conclusion was that there are numerous violence prevention 
programs, but there are very few evaluations of the programs 
(1997) . 
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As stated by Holzman, HUD Program Evaluation Division, 
"valid statistics on the level of crime in public housing do 
not exist . . . .  Even the largest public housing complexes 
typically represent small fractions of the specific 
geographic units for which official crime statistics are 
kept. Hence, our knowledge of the volume and type of crime 
in public housing and how crime in public housing compares 
to that found in other neighborhoods is woefully 
inadequate, " {p. 331, 1998) . Once procedures are devised, 
tested, and proven to reliably yield valid data, the 
effectiveness of crime control and treatment strategies can 
be evaluated {Holzman, 1999) . 
As a result of the scarcity of treatment and crime 
control evaluations in public housing, HUD shifted the 
emphasis from composing a document that assisted in 
implementing violence prevention initiatives to creating a 
manual on how to evaluate violence prevention efforts. The 
manual states that evaluation is needed in order to share 
information about what works with other agencies, improve 
programs' effectiveness, and demonstrate program 
effectiveness to the community and funding sources {1997) . 
For measurement of a program's effectiveness, HUD suggests 
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using research methods that address outcome objectives such 
as (1) reduction of crime in a complex ; (2) residents 
feeling safer ; and (3) observation of desired changes in the 
neighborhood. 
As listed in the HUD manual "A Guide to Evaluating 
Crime Control of Programs in Public Housing, " a substantial 
problem in conducting evaluations in public housing is that 
housing authorities do not typically have an evaluation and 
research staff. The manuel suggests that housing 
authorities hire outside evaluators (1997) . Below the 
findings of the two suggested HUD sponsored evaluations 
mentioned in "A Guide to Evaluating Crime Control of 
Programs in Public Housing" are reviewed. Both evaluations 
make some attempts to address community violence in public 
housing. Also, two other HUD sponsored evaluations that 
address public housing community violence are reviewed. 
Particular attention is given to how community violence is 
measured and the identification of problems encountered in 
measuring community violence. 
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Research on BUD' s Public Housing Drug Elimination Program 
One area that has received much research interest is 
HUD' s Public Housing Drug Elimination Programs. The 
research .highlights the complexity of research in public 
housing. One HUD-sponsored evaluation conducted by Abt 
Associates Inc . between July 1991 and July 1993 examined the 
local Public Housing Drug Elimination Programs (PHDEP} . The 
research is being included here because of (1) its attempts 
to measure drug-related crime in public housing and (2) 
measurement problems encountered by researchers gathering 
data in public housing developments. The programs were 
instituted in 1988 to help public housing authorities and 
Indian housing authorities combat drug use and drug-related 
crime in -their developments. The amount awarded to 617 
grantees between 1989 and 1991 was $246, 384·, o o o. The grants 
varied in size from $7, 857 to $12. 5 million. 
The evaluation consisted of a mail survey of all PHDEP 
programs and an intensive study of 15 local PHDEP programs. 
The surveys included questions regarding implementation of 
programming in five broad areas: law enforcement/security 
programming; treatment/intervention; physical improvements, 
prevention; and resident initiatives. The survey consisted 
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of two parts with part I composed of closed ended questions 
and part II composed of open ended questions. The response 
rate for the mail survey was 78 percent with 4 8 1  grantees 
responding. The final report on the evaluation states that 
no statistically significant differences were detected 
between programs that responded to the survey and those that 
did not in terms of housing authority size, geographic 
region and grant size. Inherent in the response rate is the 
indication that participation in the evaluation was 
apparently not mandatory for developments that had received 
grant money. According to Abt Associates Inc. , evaluations 
of the programs' effectiveness were subject to all the 
weaknesses of self-reporting with no external validation of 
grantees' perceived effectiveness of programming and no 
consistent measures of effectiveness of programming across 
sites. 
With major considerations for the limited quality of 
the data received by Abt Associates Inc. , following are some 
of the comments from the report. Two percent of the 
programs included residents in planning and/or hiring 
decisions. Of the 134 grants in which resident patrols were 
to be implemented, fear of retaliation from drug dealers was 
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considered a reason for lack of resident participation. 
One-third of the resident patrols were not implemented in 
any way and some were stopped out of concern that the 
environment was too dangerous. Use of UCR data to report 
drug activity appeared to be more a reflection of resources 
for arresting dealers than for frequency of drug dealing 
. activity. Housing developments characterized by high levels 
of open drug dealing with gang warfare, drive-by shootings, 
and intimidation were the least successful in implementing 
their programming. The common occurrence of gunfire was 
thought to impact residents' fear of anti-drug activities 
and to increase mistrust of housing authorities and police. 
The evaluation does indicate the need for a measure of 
community violence that is not influenced by participants' 
fear of getting hurt. Also, a measure of gunfire is needed. 
According to Abt Associated Inc. , the conditions in 
public housing are such that dramatic improvement can not be 
easily or quickly achieved. They considered the moderate or 
mixed success PHDEP achieved in Los Angeles and Chicago 
remarkable. Again, the process of mea�uring success was 
extremely inexact. The measures used were not considered 
reliable; therefore, the findings are not valid. 
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Research on Crime and Crime Prevention in Public Housing 
A second HUD-sponsored evaluation by the Research 
Triangle Institute is the "Survey of Public Housing 
Residents: Crime and Crime Prevention in Public Housing" 
(1994) . The HUD Office of Policy Development and Research 
(PD&R) contracted with the Research Triangle Institute to 
design and conduct a nationwide survey of public housing 
residents. The focus of the survey was (1) residents' 
perceptions of criminal activity, (2) opinions regarding the 
perceived effectiveness of various anti-crime initiatives, 
(3) levels of crime in public housing, and (4) perceptions 
of criminal activity. 
The survey was conducted over a two-week period with 
over 1, 500 public housing residents interviewed by phone. 
The aggregate response rate was 75%. The stratified random 
sample of telephone numbers was identified in stages with 
the initial phase involving the HUD selection of 25, 510 
addresses stratified by size of public housing authority, 
census region, and type of housing. The allocations to 
strata at this and later stages were in proportion to the 
population counts of public housing units indicated by HUD. 
From this list, a random sample of 12, 755 addresses was 
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selected with 5, 426 later being matched to telephone 
numbers. From that group of telephone numbers, 3, 112 were 
selected for another stratified sample. From this group, 
1, 479 households completed the interview and 68 partially 
completed the interview. Of the remaining households 
selected in the stratified sample, 135 refused to 
participate, 515 telephone numbers were disconnected, 42 
were wrong connections, 47 were ineligible, 268 addresses 
were incorrect, 110 spoke a language other than English or 
Spanish, and 441 households did not answer (1994) . An 
obvious measurement problem regarding the implications of 
only surveying households with telephones is addressed later 
in this paper. 
In attempting to measure aspects of community violence, 
the survey addressed individual factors of community 
violence that impact the safety of .people. Findings of the 
survey include (1) the most commonly perceived crime problem 
was the presence of drug dealers with 48% of all respondents 
considering this as . either a big problem or somewhat of a 
problem; (2) the second most frequently cited problem was 
people shooting guns; and (3) people living in low-rise 
mixed/family housing perceived the greatest problem with 
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gangs (1994) . In an analysis of this research data by 
Holzman, Kudrick, and Voytek (1996) , crime-related problems 
were highest for townhouse dwellers in the largest public 
housing authorities. A person shooting guns was the most 
frequently reported crime problem for people living in 
developments with over 501 units. Gunfire was a close 
second to drug dealing in small and medium size 
developments. The results indicate that gunfire in public 
housing is a problem. The frequency of gunfire was not 
measured. 
The issue of telephone interviewing in public housing 
presents numerous complications regarding the validity of 
the collected data and how representative the data are of 
residents without telephones. The National Victimization 
Survey indicates that people without phones are at higher 
risk of victimization. However, for people living in public 
housing Holzman and Piper did not find a statistically 
significant difference in the victimization rates between 
people with and without phones (1998) . They hypothesize 
that being nonwhite and on the very lowest end of the income 
distribution may create a type of vulnerability to 
victimization that does not vary much among residents. They 
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quickly point out that more replications of their research 
are needed since they were only focusing on two inner-city 
developments where homogeneity of the locale and physical 
characteristics of the respondents' housing may have 
influenced the results (1998) . Also, in exploring telephone 
interviewing, they allude to Lynch' s analysis of Klecka and 
Tochfarber' s research (1978) in which Klecka and Tochfarber 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of no difference 
between victimization rates recorded by telephone interviews 
and victimization rates using the NCVS, which involves some 
in-person interviewing. In Lynch' s analysis of the data, 
the null hypot�esis was rejected in a two-tail test. The 
analysis indicates that telephone interviews produce 
estimates of victimization that are higher than in-person 
interviews (1993) . The discrepancy in results calls into 
question both sets of results and indicates the need to more 
fully research questions about telephone interviews. 
Holzman and Piper suggest that the uniqueness of the 
public housing population with respect to victimization may 
lead to some revisions of the conventional wisdom that in­
person interviews obtain a higher degree of valid data. In 
their research, the mode of interviewing resulted in 
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significantly different rates of victimization. Telephone 
interviews resulted in significantly higher rates of 
victimization than in-person interviewing (p < 0. 05, two­
tailed test) . They also indicated that victimization rates 
were higher when people were interviewed individually rather 
than when they spoke for others in their households. The 
victimization rates people recorded for others was lower 
than the rate listed when each person was individually 
interviewed (1998) . With regard to measurement problems, 
caution is given that use of telephones for interviewing and· 
speaking with only one spokesperson per family impacts the 
results of research. 
HUD ' s  Creation of an Instrument Measuring Victimization 
To address methodological issues and reiearch 
strategies in measuring crime in public housing, Holzman and 
Piper created the Victimizati�n Survey of Public Housing 
Residents (VSPHR) . The instrument is patterned after the 
National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) , but the 
objective of the VSPHR project was to create an instrument 
and associated methodology appropriate for evaluating the 
effects of crime prevention programs in public housing 
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{ 1998) . The VSPHR project was the first systematic attempt 
in public housing to apply the National Crime Victimization 
Survey approach to public housing. Modifications in the 
NCVS provide information about the type of public housing in 
which people live as well as more in depth data on the 
nature of crime in their housing developments. In contrast, 
the NCVS has only recently added a check box .for people to 
identify themselves as living in public housing. With the 
VSPHR, questions are specifically asked about behaviors that 
endanger th� safety of people in public places. 
The goals of the VSPHR project were (1) to explore 
whether the NCVS approach would work in public housing where 
crime is a problem and { 2) to develop tools for evaluating 
the effectiveness of crime prevention programs in public 
housing. Holzman and Piper consider the VSPHR project a 
step toward transferring the technology of the U. S. Census 
Bureau to a more usable tool for public housing authorities. 
Methodological issues and research strategies explored in 
the project included using the NCVS approach of purposive 
sampling for selection of developments; not paying 
respondents; and not paying participants in the research. 
Under "lessons learned, " they suggest checking the 
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prevalence of telephones before deciding on the interview 
mode, and verifying of phone numbers so that wrong numbers 
do not take the place of correct numbers and thereby lead to 
under coverage of phone households (1998) . 
Like the NCVS, the VSPHR is a lengthy survey. The 
survey consists of 16 pages for the household respondent and 
16 pages for each individual respondent in the home. In 
addition, the incident report is 19 pages. The survey asks 
questions about vandalism, acts of violence, theft, gunshots 
heard, and drug deals- seen. A major problem is that 
interviews are costly and time consuming (Popkin et. al. , 
1998) . 
Research Using the VSPHR 
The first official test of HUD' s victimization survey 
(VSPHR) was implemented in the assessment of the Chicago 
Housing Authority's Henry Horner Homes Revitali zation 
Initiative (1998) . The test of the instrument demonstrated 
that (1) non-resident and resident interviewers could 
successfully administer the survey in public housing and the 
nearby community and (2) that respondents in public housing 
and the nearby communities were willing to cooperate . A 
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problem was discovered in obtaining data from respondents 
who had experienced multiple victimizations. People were 
reluctant to fill out an incident report for each 
victimization. As a result, a modification was made in the 
VSPHR with respondents filling out only one report for each 
type of victimization reported (Popkin et. al. , 1998) . The 
problems of interviews being costly and time consuming 
remained. 
The research on the Henry Horner Revitalization Program 
addresses many aspects of community violence including 
gunfire. For this reason this paper provides more detailed 
information on this work. Also, the study is a major 
example of the important role research can provide in the 
effective use of money and resources. The assessment has 
given planners vital information on possible problems to 
consider in developing the additional $1 billion allotted 
HOPE VI housing. The evaluation identifies factors that are 
potentially very important to the future success of some 
HOPE VI projects. 
Evaluation of the early stages of the Horner 
Revitalization Program indicates many problems in the 
program . Large amounts of money are being spent to change 
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the architectural design of public housing, but other 
factors within the development have limited the 
successfulness of the program. Factors limiting the success 
of the HOPE VI Program include crime, lack of employment, 
lack of social cohesion in the community, and insufficient 
_ social and employment services. The VSPHR data provided by 
residents living in the newly designed development indicate 
that overall crime is about the same except that gang 
related crime is worse. �Periods of quiet are defined as 
days or weeks when less gunfire can be heard and few 
residents are shot - not times when the violence has 
ceased, " (Popkin, et. al., p. 10, 1998) . Victimization 
rates for people living in the Horner Development were 7 2  
per 100. The victimization rate for people in the 
surrounding community was 44 per 100. Data from the in­
person interviews indicate that victimization rates are 
highest for people living less than five years in the Horner 
Development and for people without telephones. 
One concern expressed by the residents in the 
assessment is that security and services in the Chicago 
Housing Authority (CHA) property have decreased. In 1994, 
CHA spent approximately $77 million on anti-drug programs 
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and security. The 1998 budget reduced the amount to $39 
million with 152 security officers being dismissed. The 
development looks much better architecturally, but the crime 
level has made it unlikely that people with higher incomes 
will choose to live in this community. People are skeptical 
that residents can work together to create a safer 
community. Seventy-seven percent of the respondents do not 
believe that �people in this neighborhood can be trusted, " 
and neighbors are often perceived as potentially dangerous. 
Other findings indicate an unemployment rate of 42% and 
insufficient social and employment services. A needs 
assessment of community services mandated in the Mothers 
Guild decree indicates a lack of services, but no funds have 
been appropriated for services to address these needs 
(Popkin, et. al. , 1998) . 
A related study recently completed by Popkin et al. 
consisted of a qualitative and quantitative longitudinal 
analysis of the Chicago Housing Authority's Anti-Drug 
Initiative. The Anti-Drug Initiative from 1994-1996 was 
Chicago Housing Authority's most in-depth attack on crime 
with an average of $80 million spent each of the three 
years. The research was conducted between 1994 and 1996 in 
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three buildings in each of three developments including 
Henry Horner. Multiple methods used to assess the impact of 
the anti-drug programs included ethnographic observation of 
each development, a content analysis of the Chicago Sun 
Times and the Chicago Tribune from 1988 through 1996, six 
rounds of in-depth interviews with a small group of key 
residents, two rounds of interviews with staff implementing 
the anti-drug programs, and four waves of door-to-door 
surveys using the VSPHR. 
The findings of the evaluation were not encouraging. 
The three main areas evaluated were (1) physical disorder, 
(2) social disorder, and (3) violent crime. Conditions 
worsened in all three areas. Conditions were better in 
1995, but gains were quickly lost in 1996. Two factors were 
considered to impact the loss of improvements made in 1995. 
An unexpected increase in gang violence was attributed to 
arrest of many of the gang leaders. Residents indicated 
that weakening the leadership of one gang resulted in an 
increase in gang violence to reestablish the new gang 
leadership and turf. Similarly, the closure and demolition 
of some buildings created a gang power vacuum in neighboring 
areas that resulted in more crime. The results of changing 
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the nature of the gang activity actually worsened t he crime 
conditions within the developments. The researchers 
hypothesize t hat the only solution may be demolition of . the 
worst public housing. Their data indicate that 79% of 
residents living in low-rise housing and 85% of people 
living in high rise public housing would like to move to 
another type of housing, but t his presents other problems. 
Chicago has limited resources in privat e  housing and many of 
the residents in public housing have personal problems or 
crime histories that make t hem unwelcome in the private 
housing sector (Popkin, et al., 1999) . 
Additional findings further complicate the measure of 
program effectiveness. First, residents are very reluctant 
to report crime or even talk about levels of violence. The 
prevalent view appears to be that talking about t hings can 
get a person hurt. The researchers stat e  t hat the levels of 
victimization recorded are most probably substantially 
underestimated. Secondly, households where someone worked 
for pay indicat ed the highest level of concern about social 
disorder, physical disorder, and violence. Thirdly, in two 
developments, victimization rates were higher in May than in 
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December for each of the three years measured (Popkin et 
al. , 1999) . 
The findings of Popkin et al. reflect that measurement 
of community violence in public housing is very complicated 
(1999) . Official crime counts do not come close to the 
actual levels of victimization mentioned by residents of 
some housing developments (Garbarino, 1997; Perry, 1997; 
Riechters & Martinez, 1993) . Also, the processes of 
measuring individual levels of victimization are very costly 
(Popkin et al. , 1998) . 
Research on "Bot Spots" in Public Housing Developments 
In attempting to get a more manageable view of crime in 
public housing, Mazerolle and Terrill shift the focus from 
the entire public housing development to units of analysis 
in the development where crime is the most prevalent (1997) . 
They call their focus a problem-oriented policing project 
that identifies specific locations within developments where 
most problems occur . In six public housing developments in 
Jersey City, New Jersey, random samples of residents were 
asked to identify areas they avoid because of high crime. 
They indicated that three-quarters of the common areas 
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identified a�  having violent crime are in low rise 
developments. Mazerolle and Terrill state that public 
housing sites need to be viewed according to the 
distribution of crimes within the development rather than 
the entire site being considered a crime "hot spot. " They 
caution that each housing development is different and that 
one size fits all programming is very inappropriate. Crime 
within the area needs to first be analyzed before initiating 
crime control and prevention activities (1997) . 
A similar approach to identifying the "hot spot" areas 
within the public housing developments is crime mapping. In 
crime mapping the locations of reported crimes are . recorded 
with areas having the most prevalent crime rates identified. 
Presently, research is being conducted in Charlotte, NC, and 
Memphis, TN, to further address measurement problems in 
identifying crime "hot spot" areas in public housing. In 
Charlotte, Rutgers University' s Center for Urban Policy 
Research is working with the Charlotte public housing agency 
and the local police department to track · 911 calls and 
police activities in order to identify crime "hot spots. " A 
second part of their project is to develop software to map 
crime data in public housing. The software will be used to 
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identify "hot spots" which may appear as parking lots, 
individual apartments, or other public places. The hope is 
that resources can be more effectively utilized when the 
nature of crime in public housing is better understood 
(Holzman, 1� 99) . 
As mentioned previously in the review of research on 
public housing community violence, recurrent measurement 
problems include (1) many people in public housing do not 
report crimes, and (2) police activity in recording crimes 
in public housing, for offenses such as drug dealing, are 
often more a factor of allocation of police resources than 
frequency of drug trafficking behaviors. A related factor 
is indicated by Jeremy Travis, National Institute of 
Justice: repeat victimizations are highest in high crime 
areas, but repeat victims are less likely to notify police 
(1996) . In 1999 crime mapping, Holzman considered the 
medical trauma reported at hospitals as the most valid 
source of crime data (1999) . 
Concerns Regarding Measures of Community Vio1ence 
In summary, measuring the level of community violence 
in many public housing developments is very complicated. 
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Gains have been made in measuring some factors of community 
violence. The Center for Disease Control Centers measures 
the number of murders in the United States and their 
National Electronic Injury Surveillance System continues to 
collect firearm-related injuries from a population-based 
sample of 91 emergency departments throughout the country. 
The Uniform Crime Report provides information regarding the 
crimes reported to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and 
the National Crime Victimization Survey provides 
victimization data on general trends of victimization in the · 
United States. Both provide massive sources of data 
regarding crimes and victimizations that occurred two years 
ago. More specifically, measures of victimization of · 
residents in public housing continue to be developed . . 
Measures of children's levels of victimization and exposure 
to violence also contribute important data. Presently, 
crime mapping is being developed to provide specific 
information on crimes reported in public housing. Many 
gains have been made in the area of measuring community 
violence, but the frequencies of many of the factors of 
community violence are unknown. For example, children and 
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adults often list gunfire as a concern, but gunfire is not 
measured in public housing. 
Additional measures are still needed. As stated by 
Satcher et al. : 
Given the great perceived urgency for addressing this 
problem (violence) , it is not surprising that many 
people feel we must act right away, without taking time 
to await the result of calculated scientific trials. 
Urgency lead� people to think there will be - indeed, 
that there must be - an answer that is simple and 
readily discoverable. Yet the results that are 
beginning to come forth suggest that the answer will 
not be so simple, discoverable, yes; simple, no . . . .  
Interventions must encompass individual and social 
factors (p. v, 1996) . 
Measures that are cost efficient and responsive to 
frequent changes in violence levels are needed. Having a 
measure of community violence that is sensitive to immediate 
changes in the nature of community violence would be 
helpful. For this measure at least to assess some factors 
of community violence during different times of a day or 
week would make possible a more appropriate allocation of 
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security resources. A time sensitive measure for a week 
could also provide valuable information about the 
effecti venes_s of interventions in a community. Being more 
informed regarding the level of violence in a particular 
community would make possible modifications in programming 
to better fit the safety needs of a community. 
Regarding the effects of community violence on children 
·living in public housing, we actually know very little about 
the levels of community violence in many developments. 
Having a better measure of the level of community violence 
would allow a better understanding of its impact on 
children. As indicted by Richters and Martinez, the term 
"community violence" is used with a vagueness that tells us 
very little about what is actually happening in a specific 
community (1 _99 3} . As stated by Nunnally, the measurement 
validity of a variable is necessary before interrelations 
among variables can be examined (1978} . Higher degrees of 
measurement validity are needed when measuring assaults, 
shootings, and verbal threats in public housing. 
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CHAPTER IV 
Methodology 
The guiding research question of this study was how 
valid are individuals' reports of gunfi�e in their 
communities. 
Hypotheses 
The fol.lowing research hypotheses were formulated to 
better understand the validity of individuals' reports of 
gunfire: 
1. A positive relationship exists between recorded counts 
of gunfire and individuals' reports of gunfire. 
2. A relationship exists between recorded counts of 
gunfire and 911 calls about gunfire. 
3. Individuals' reports of gunfire have a higher 
correlation with recorded gunfire than with 9 11 
gunshot calls. 
4. A relationship exists between individuals' 
reports of gunfire and reported assaults (two-tailed) . 
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Rationale 
A criterion validity study of individuals' reports of 
gunfire and recorded counts of gunfire is important for 
three reasons. The first reason is related to the lack of a 
comprehensive measure of community violence. Basic to the 
process of d�veloping a comprehensive measure of community 
violence is the need to establish the criterion validity of 
indicators of community violence. Gunfire in a community is 
one indicator of community violence. The most frequently 
mentioned indicators of community violence are data from the 
Uniform Crime Report, the National Crime Victimization 
Survey and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) . These 
frequently used indicators provide important but .limited 
information. The Uniform Crime Report (UCR) underestimates 
the actual occurrence of violent activity. The National 
Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) suggests that only 62. 4% 
of the crimes reported on the survey were reported to 
police. The NCVS data also suggests that only 1 8. 1 % of the · 
crimes of violence are reported in UCR data (2001) .  The 
NCVS is limited in use in that it takes approximately 2 
years to complete. Available information is not current nor 
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is it available for all areas. The information from the CDC 
is based on people being wounded and reporting to a 
hospital. No assumption is made that all victims of 
community violence report to a hospital. Thus, further 
indicators of community violence are needed to address these 
limitations. The need for additional clarity in the level 
of community violence is especially vital in communities 
where people do not report violence out of fear of 
retaliation (Travis, 1996) . 
The second reason for establishing the criterion 
validity for family reports of gunfire is that community 
leaders' response to gunfire reports are apt to be tailored 
by people who do not live in the designated community. If 
the perception is that people are sensationalizing the 
actual count, concerns may be less apt to be addressed. 
Similarly, if individual reports are considered more a 
reflection of what families hear on television programs than 
in their neighborhoods, interventions will address 
television programming or viewing times. 
The third reason for establishing the criterion 
validity of family reports of gunfire is that over 50 
percent of residents of larger publi� housing authorities 
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list gunfire as a major problem in the community (HUD, 
1999) . Many interventions have been implemented to reduce 
gunfire, but measurements to assess the effectiveness of 
these interventions are scarce. The most commonly used 
measure is to compare UCR data as pretest and �osttest 
criteria. For community policing programs, which lists 
. reporting of crimes as a major goal, an elevated UCR rate 
may be more an indication of community policing working 
rather than of an increase in community violence. 
A major problem exists in evaluating the effectiveness 
of programs to improve the safety of communities with 
repeated episodes of random gunfire. As mentioned earlier, 
a comprehens_ive measure of community violence does not 
exist. Establishing the validity of individuals' reports of 
gunfire would be an initial step toward addressing the 
problem of random gunfire. In addition, Tolan et al. 
indicate that neighborhood monitoring and protection of 
youth are basic to reducing youth risk in high crime 
neighborhoods (2003) . Identification of gunfire patterns 
would provide a tool for allocating safety and treatment 
resources to better meet needs. 
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Target Population 
This study was conducted in two areas designated as 
gunfire "hotspots" by a local police department in the 
Southeast. The rationale for studying this population was 
that the areas were identified as having problems with 
random gunfire. The term "hotspot" was used by police 
departments to indicate that the designated areas had 
frequencies of gunfire 911 police calls that were 2 to 3 
· standard deviations above the norm for that city. · Families 
living in a one-half mile radius of the designated hotspots 
were the target population. 
Sampling 
The sample size for this study was 116. For 116 days 
an instrument built for the purpose of recording gunfire was 
positioned to collect recordings of gunfire incidents. 
Each area consisted of a mixture of dense�y spaced 
apartments a�d more sparsely _placed single family houses. 
In order to ensure that each household had an equal chance 
of being selected, a simple random sample was selected from 
each area. The two random samples were selected from a 
listing of telephone numbers in a one-half mile radius of 
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the "hotspot. " If a family was unavailable, the next 
randomly selected family was interviewed. One adult from 
each selected family was asked about the gunfire frequency 
in the last 24 hours. All adult residents of the area were 
considered potential reporters. No children were 
interviewed. Interviews were conducted by telephone. 
Addresses with telephone numbers listed in the most current . 
local City Directory provided the information for random 
selection. 
Instrumentation 
Four instruments were used in this study_. One was a 
questionnaire that asked one adult in a family about recent 
gunfire activity in . their neig�borhood. Prior . to asking any 
questions, individuals were assured that no identifying 
information would be recorded. 
A second instrument recorded the occurrence and time of 
gunfire at a rooftop height. �he sensor detected gunfire in 
an approximately one-half mile radius, depending on wind and 
background noise. Modification in the sensitivity of the 
instrument was reduced in order to decrease the likelihood 
of human voices being recorded. The instrument consisted of 
114 
a laptop computer adapted with the One Sensor ShotSpotter 
software and a Shotspotter sensor. 
The third instrument was the publicly . assessable data 
reported to the local emergency management center and to the 
local police department. This information included 911 
calls reporting gunfire, reported assaults, and murders. 
The fourth instrument was the local weather station' s 
recordings of precipitation and atmospheric temperatures for 
each day. 
Gunfire Detection Technology 
The most difficult aspect of this research was 
obtaining appropriate equipment for conducting the research. 
This search for equipment took many forms. Initially the 
concern was getting a recording device that would record for 
at least 24 hours. An engineering student modified a VCR 
and a microphone in order to record for 24 hours. This 
presented privacy issues regarding the recording of human 
voices. This led to numerous consultations with engineers 
and physicists regarding filtering the recordings of sound 
waves. An environmental expert checked the possibility of 
using equipment that monitors sound pollution. Numerous 
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security consultants gave information on the latest security 
equipment used by law enforcement officials. 
Two national trainers with the U . S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation offered information on the latest technology 
for detecting gunfire. Two companies in the United States 
were mentioned by both consultants. Both companies were 
contacted, and each developer described their technology. 
The type of technology offered by one company detected 
gunfire within a building. This system only worked with the 
presence of solid walls to reflect sounds. The technology 
was used in a few prisons and other high security buildings 
where there was a heightened concern for the occurrence of 
gunfire. 
The second company mentioned by the FBI consultants 
involved the u�e of equipment that identified gunfire 
incidents and made recordings of gunshots immediately 
available to law enforcement personnel. This technology was 
invented by Dr. Robert Showen, an electrical engineer and 
space physicist. He provided the concept and initial 
dev�lopment of the ShotSpotter. ShotSpotter analyzes each 
pulse in a detected incident. Within 10 seconds after a 
shot is fired, the system alerts a dispatcher of the event. 
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A four-second sound recording is saved along with each 
incident. The annunciator beeps and flashes a small red 
light intermittently until a dispatch views the event and 
clears it. The entire location and notification process is 
completed within 6 to 10 seconds after the shot was fired. 
Within a few additional seconds the dispatcher listens to 
the sound and decides whether to dispatch an officer. The 
firm, Shotspotter, Incorporated was founded in 2002. The 
company has worked at various sites to reduce the levels of 
random gunfire. They received a contract from the U. S. 
Department of Justice for a double installation in 
Charleston and North Charleston, South Carolina in 2003. 
The need for this study was technology that could 
filter human voices, record the sound of gunfire, and keep 
recorded information highly confidential. In January, 2003, 
Dr. Showen stated that he thought it would be possible to 
modify ShotSpotter· for use as a single sensor. He and Dr. 
Robert Calhoun modified the software and a laptop computer 
for use in this study. The equipment was received July 3, 
2003. 
The sensor began recording data in January, 2004. The 
main problem at the first site was basic use of the system. 
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There were minor problems related to use of the equipment, 
but even minor problems resulted in loss of recording days. 
A simple problem could shut down the research. The main 
problem in use of the equipment at the first site was the 
learning curve for the person conducting the study. Gaining 
familiarity with use of the equipment was important. 
Technical assistance by phone addressed technical problems. 
The One Sensor Shotspotter recorded close gunfire with 
clarity . . The occurrence of bottle rockets, firecrackers 
bricks, or thunder were distinguished from gunfire by the 
sounds of the recordings and by the appearance of waveform 
plots. 
The first site (area A) was at the corner of a location 
that was considered a "hotspot" for gunfire activity. The 
placement of the Shotspotter equipment was based more on 
concern for not getting the equipment s·tolen than for 
proximity to gunfire. The device was placed in a highly 
·secure business that had a history of no break-ins. The 
business had double security fencing. Doors were 
electronically controlled and motion sensors were placed 
throughout the building. The plus of this location was very 
little concern about the safety of the equipment. The 
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problem was that only gunfire in close proximity to this 
business was recorded. The initial recordings indicated 25, 
8, 3, and 17 shots in the 2:00 a. m. to 4:00 a. m. time frame 
for the first four days of recording gunfire. The gunfire 
was easily distinguished by the appearance of waveform plots 
and the sounds on the recordings. 
A problem was that the sensor did not pick up gunfire 
. 5  mile from the sensor. Three gunfire assault emergency 
calls occurred close (within . 25 mile) to the site and had 
corresponding gunfire recordings on ShotSpotter. Two 
emergency gunfire calls for service from distances closer to 
. 5  mile did not have corresponding gunfire recordings on the 
Shotspotter equipment. The building with the attached 
sensor was located in the lowest region of the neighborhood. 
This was against the advice of Dr. Showen, but the 
overriding concern was protection of the equipment. 
Placing the sensor in a valley appeared to reduce the 
ability of the sensor to pick up gunfire at the apartment 
buildings located at the far end of area A. A change in 
sensitivity settings in the Shotspotter equipment also 
resulted in decreasing the range covered by the Shotspotter 
sensor. This was not reversed due to concerns regarding 
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recording human conversation. The equipment did record 
unintelligible yells during some gunfire recordings. A 
corresponding data collection problem for the area around 
the apartment buildings was that the City Directory listed 
less than 5 phone numbers . for people living in that housing 
development. The gunfire activity in that region of area A 
was therefore not reflected in either the ShotSpotter or 
interview data. 
At the second site the sensor was placed on a very tall 
building. A major problem at that site was picking up AM 
radio frequency waves. Lt. Robert . Hubbs, a consultant from 
the Charleston project, suggested adding ferrite data line 
radio frequency filters. This reduced the level of radio 
program recordings to less than 5% of the data collected. A 
second problem was finding a location away from air 
conditioning units. The sensor was moved twice to increase 
distance from the units and reduce white noise. 
Data Analysis 
A survey design was used for the data collection of 
interview information. Originally, the plan was to evaluate 
correlations .between the independent variable, recorded 
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gunfire, and residents' reports of gu�fire. The types of 
statistical procedures used in this study were changed due 
to the correlation between current and previous gunfire 
recordings. The observations of recorded gunfire were not 
independent of each other. 
The statistical procedures used to evaluate 
relationships between recorded gunfire and residents' 
responses involved the following steps: 
1. diagnosing the series of recorded gunfire for 
autocorrelations and periodicity; 
2. identifying the model for the series of gunfire 
recordings using the autoregressive integrated 
moving average (ARIMA) function; 
3. using the ARIMA function to determine variable 
coefficients and levels of significance for the 
independent and control variables. 
ARIMA analyses were used to examine the relationships 
between recorded gunfire and residents' reports of gunfire 
for three different time frames: the 24 hours prior to the 
interview, the hours between 5 : 01 p. m. and 12:00 a. m. , and 
the hours between 12:01 a. m. and 5:00 a. m. 
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Pearson and Spearman' s rho correlations were used to 
examine relationships between 9 11 data and residents' 
responses. 
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CHAPTER V 
Results 
The data from this study were analyzed and ordered 
according to presence of gunfire, time of gunfire, patterns 
of gunfire, and eme·rgency calls for help dealing with 
gunfire. Data from the interviews, ShotSpotter, and 911 
emergency calls were analyzed for relationships among the 
variables. This indicated whether the data did or did not 
support the hypotheses of this study. 
For this study 342 people were interviewed by telephone 
using the study questionnaire. (See appendix A) . A one­
sensor ShotSpotter collected gunfire recordings for 119 days 
in the two areas where the respondents lived. The two 
selected areas were identified by police crime reports as 
having moderate difficulty with gunfire. 
Presence of Gunfire 
The dependent variable for this study was the number of 
gunshots recorded by a ShotSpotter device. Most of the 
measures of independent variables were based on the 
residents' responses to interview questions. 
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ShotSpotter Data Results 
The range of number of gunshots - recorded was from zero 
to 65, with zero being the mode. (See Table 6). At the 
first site (Area A), a police intervention occurred six days 
after data collection began. The gunfire activity almost 
stopped ·completely in this area. The day prior to the 
increased police activity, 16 shots were recorded from 3:10 
a. m. to 3:58 a. m. Following the intervention very little 
gunfire was recorded for the remaining 50 days of 
ShotSpotter data collection in this area. During the data 
collection time frame, this area was targeted for economic 
development with many funding sources included. Also, 
Habitat for Humanity began construction on two houses. The 
first ten days of gunfire recordings were not included due 
to an excessive amount of missing data (76%). Initial 
missing data were due to getting everything to work at the 
same time. Then, due to the low variability in the range of 
gunfire data from Area A, it was not possible to accurately 
calculate correlations and ARIMA analyses from Area A data. 
As indicated by Figure 6. 1, restriction of range was 
not a problem in Area B. Gunfire recording data from Area B 
were used in computing ARIMA analyses and correlations with 
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Table 6. Frequency Distribution of Daily Gunfire Counts 
Gunfire Cumulative 
Counts Fre�enc;t: Percent 
. 00 5 5  4 6 . 2  
1 . 00 5 50 . 4  
2 . 00 5 5 4 . 6  
3 . 00 7 60 . 5  
4 . 00 6 65 . 5  
5 . 00 2 67 . 2  
7 . 0 0 7 7 3 . 1  
8 . 00 4 7 6 . 5 
9 . 00 2 7 8 . 2  
10 . 0 0 1 7 9 . 0  
1 1 . 00 4 82 . 4  
12 . 0 0 3 8 4 . 9  
13 . 0 0 1 8 5 . 7  
15 . 0 0 2 87 . 4  
1 6 . 0 0 1 8 8 . 2  
17 . 0 0 1 8 9 . 1  
2 0 . 00 1 8 9 . 9 
2 1 . 0 0 1 90 . 8  
2 6 . 0 0 2 92 . 4  
27 . 0 0 3 95 . 0  
4 0 . 0 0 1 95 . 8  
4 2 . 0 0 1 96 . 6  
4 9 . 00 1 97 . 5  
60 . 0 0 1 98 . 3  
64 . 00 1 9 9 . 2  
65 . 0 0 1 10 0 . 0  
Total 1 1 9  
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Number 
of 
Gunshots 
70 . 00 
60 . 00 
50 . 00 
40 . 00 
30 . 00 
20 . 00 
10 . 00 
0 . 00 
Area A 
Area B 
Day Leading Drug 
Dealer Sentenced 
m .... 
What is today ' s  date? 
Figure 6 . 1  Gunshots in Area A and Area B 
1 2 6 
.... .... w 
independent - variables. The second site (area B) had a 
higher density of homes as well as a government housing 
development. From viewing media reports, there appeared to 
be little economic interest in developing this area. Crime 
data seemed to indicate that the area had a more serious 
gunfire problem. Three weeks into recording data in area B, 
gunfire activity appeared to substantially increase. The 
increase in numbers of gunshots began the day a few leading 
people in the drug business were sentenced for lengthy 
prison stays. Since there were no controls or measures for 
activity in the selected site, the gunfire increase could 
have been due to many other factors not presently known. In 
addition, during two late night gunfire checks, the gunshots 
appeared to be coming from a community park. This differed 
from views that the gunfire was primarily coming from areas 
in the housing development. Consistent with earlier 
communication with residents, most shots seemed to be aimed 
into the air, not at anything or anyone. The late night 
gunfire checks only occurred two nights and were therefore 
not significant in terms of location. 
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Patterns of Recorded Gunfire 
Gunfire recordings were much more prevalent at night, 
with 94. 5% of the gunfire recordings occurring at night, and 
only 5. 5% recorded during the day. Most of the shot 
recordings occurred very late at night or in the very early 
morning. Most shots occurred in rapid succession, with 
several shots being recorded in a small frame of time. For 
example, during one 24 hour span, 28 shots were recorded in 
the seven minutes between 2 : 33 a. m. and 2 : 40 a. m. As is 
addressed below, gunfire recordings were more prevalent on 
Saturday and Friday nights. No gunfire was recorded during 
rainy weather. 
Interview Results 
Of . the 342 people interviewed, 148 lived in area A and 
194 in area B. The respondents were randomly selected from 
listings in the City Directory. In the first sample, 139 of 
the 148 respondents in area A lived in houses, and seven in 
apartments. In the second sample 8 5  of the 194 respondents 
in area B lived in houses, and 103 in apartments. A problem 
with data collection was that the City Directory' s listings 
were not representative of the community. The Directory 
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listed less than 10 phone numbers for people living in a 
government housing development located in area B. Of the 
people interviewed, 97. 9% of the respondents had lived in 
their homes for over three years and the remaining 2. 1% from 
one to three years. People who lived in their homes less 
than three years were underrepresented in the sample. 
Time of Day 
Of the 340 people answering the question, "Do you ever 
hear gunshots in your neighborhood, " 338 answered "yes, " and 
only two answered "no. " To get a better idea of whether 
people heard gunshots during the traditional hours for 
sleep, respondents were asked if gunfire ever bothered their 
sleep. Elev�n people (3. 3%) responded that gunfire had not 
bothered their sleep, and 320 people (96. 7%) responded that 
it had. For the question asking the time of day when a 
person was most likely to hear gunfire, 334 people said 
"night" and only two responded "day. " This was consistent 
with the ShotSpotter data which indicated that 94. 5% of the 
gunfire recordings occurred at night. Many of the night 
recordings also included multiple shots. These results were 
consistent with the hypothesis that a positive relationship 
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existed between recorded counts of gunfire and individuals' 
reports of gunfire. 
Day of Week 
People were asked to identify the day of the week when 
they were most likely to hear gunfire . Even though asked 
which "day" they heard the most gunfire, many people 
responded with multiple days, most especially "Friday" and 
"Saturday. " The most frequent response was Saturday, with 
70. 7%. Table 7 summarizes subjects' responses. This table 
includes some multiple responses from persons, such as their 
responses that they heard the most gunfire on Friday and 
Saturday. The responses from residents were consistent with 
data recorded by ShotSpotter. Shotspotter data also 
indicated that there were more shot recordings on Saturday 
than for any other day of the week. The sum of ShotSpotter 
recordings for each day of the week ranged from 38 shots on 
Monday to 335 shots on Saturday, as shown in Table 8. 
ShotSpotter data indicated the highest mean for Saturday, M 
= 19. 71 (SD = 24. 69) . Means for other days of the week were 
Monday, M = 2. 37, (SD = 5. 10} ; Tuesday, M = 3. 60, (SD = 
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Table 7. Which Day Do People Bear the Most Gunfire? 
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday 
2 0 1 1 2 1 9  2 5 6  1 1  
Table 8 .  ShotSpotter Recordings for Each Day of the Week 
What is the 
day of the Std .  
week? N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean Deviation 
Monday 
1 6  . 00 20 . 00 38 . 00 2 . 3750 5 . 09738 
Tuesday 
15 . 00 1 6 . 00 5 4 . 00 3 . 6000 5 .  52 656 · 
Wednesday 
17  . 00 27 . 00 1 0 5 . 00 6 . 17 65 8 . 95988 
Thursday 
1 6  . 00 27 . 00 95 . 00 5 . 9375 7 . 78 4 33 
Friday 
1 6  . 00 4 9 . 00 1 0 1 . 00 6 . 3125 13 . 1 1 853 
Saturday 
17  . 00 65 . 00 335 . 00 1 9 . 7059  24 . 69252 
Sunday 
17  . 00 21 . 00 8 5 . 00 5 . 0000 6 . 33 4 4 3  
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5. 53) , Wednesday, M = 6. 18, (SD = 8 . 96) ; Thursday, M = 5. 93, 
(SD = 7. 78) ; and Friday, M = 6. 31, (SD = 13. 12) . 
In this study data from both the interviews and 
SpotShotter indicated that Saturday was the day of the week 
with the highest level of gunfire. This was supportive of 
the hypothesis that a positive relationship existed between 
recorded counts of gunfire and individuals' reports of 
gunfire. 
Evaluation of Autocorrelations in the Dependent Variable 
Before continuing to evaluate the relationship between 
residents' reports of gunfire and recorded counts in Area B, 
· a concern was that observations of the dependent variable, 
recorded gunshots, were not independent of previous gunfire 
recordings, i. e. , that the count data were autocorrelated. 
An analysis of the autocorrelation structure in the 
ShotSpotter data was conducted using procedures described by 
Ostrom (1990) and McDowell, McCleary, Meidinger, and �ay 
(1980) . Of the 65 days of data collection in Area B, seven 
days had missing data. During those days, AM radio 
frequency wave disruptions were a major problem. Then, a 
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connector on the adapted ShotSpotter laptop broke. The 
seven days of missing data occurred sequentially. 
Diagnosis of Autocorrelations 
The autocorrelation function was estimated using SPSS. 
The plot for this function is shown in Figure 6. 2 .  The 
autocorrelation function showed significant spikes at days 
seven (. 271) and 21 (. 321) . These residuals suggested a 
seasonal autocorrelation with a seven-day periodicity (AR 
seasonal) component (Ostrom, 1990) . 
Identifying the Autocorrelation Model 
Following Ostrom (1990) and McDowell, et al. , (1980) , 
an ARIMA (0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) model was tried to describe 
mathematically the process generating the autocorrelations. 
(See Table 9) . As indicated in Figure 6. 3 the use of the 
seven-day periodicity (AR seasonal) component appeared to 
account for the seven-day cycles . As seen in Table 9, the 
results of fitting an ARIMA (0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) model indicated 
that a lag three (SAR3) seasonal autocorrelation was 
statistically significant . The residuals analysis suggested 
that an ARIMA (0, 0, 0, )  (3, 0, 0) model appeared to specify the 
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Table 9 .  ARIMA 1 : Model for Recorded Gunfire 
( 0 , 0 , 0 )  ( 3 , 0 , 0 )  
Model Description : 
Variable : Recorded Gunshots in Area B 
Regressors : None 
Length of Seasonal Cycle : 7 
Number of residuals :  5 8  
Variables in  the Model : 
B SEB 
SARl . 238211  . 12060 4 5  
SAR2 - . 031 635 . 1318 4 82 
SAR3 . 4 7 64 0 3  . 17 64 15 4  
CONSTANT 11 . 934 7 1 2  3 . 655 964 8 
T-RATIO 
1 .  975 1 4 5 5  
- . 2 3 9938 6 
2 . 7004 5 93 
3 . 264 4 4 94  
APPROX . PROB . 
. 05327 908  
. 8 1 12 69 8 5  
. 00918 4 5 1  
. 00 1 8 8 9 4 4  
Unstandardi zed coefficients for variables , B and unstandardized 
coefficients for estimated standard errors , -SEB; seasonal 
autocorrelation lag 1 ,  SARl ; seasonal autocorrelation lag 2 ,  SAR2 ; 
seasonal autocorrelation lag 3 ,  SAR3 ; e < . 05 ,  two-tailed . 
nature of the relationships between error terms. With the 
parameters of the recorded gunshots errors estimated, the 
relationships between recorded gunfire and residents' 
responses were analyzed. 
Presence of Gunfire in the Last 2 4  Hours 
Residents identified a general presence of gunfire, the 
time of day when gunfire was more likely, and the day of the 
week when gunfire was more prevalent. ARIMA analyses were 
conducted to further test the relationship between 
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residents' responses regarding gunfire and recorded gunfire 
during three time frames: daily, night time, and early 
morning. Daily count was defined as the total number of 
recordings within the 24-hour interview time frame. Night 
time shots were defined as between 5:01 p. m. and 12:00 a. m. 
Early morning shots were defined as the total recorded 
between 12:01 a. m. and 5:00 a. m. An interview day was 
defined as the 24 hours prior to the resident's interview. 
Additional ARIMA analyses were conducted with weather 
variables that might potentially impact the amount of 
gunfire. Consistent with the original hypothesis stating 
that a positive relationship existed between recorded counts 
of gunfire and residents' responses, a directional 
hypothesis test was used to indicate statistical 
significance. The analyses between weather variables and 
recorded gunfire were nondirectional since either positive 
or negative results could be informative. With the ARIMA 
(0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) autocorrelation function controlling for the 
seven day periodicity, the following ARIMA analyses were 
conducted: 
ARIMA 2. DV: Area B gunfire recordings 
IV: Average number of gunshots reported by 
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residents 
IV: Percentage of residents reporting the 
presence of gunfire; 
ARIMA 3. DV: Area B gunfire recordings 
IV: Low temperature 
IV: High temperature 
IV: Precipitation-
The results from ARIMA 2 indicated that people' s 
reports of gunfire in the last 24 hours were not 
statistically significant. When controlling for seasonal 
autocorrelations, numbers of gunshots reported by residents 
did not appear valid (i. e. � =  -. 300, ! = -. 129, E > . 05, 
one-tailed) . When controlling for seasonal 
autocorrelations, the percentage of people reporting the 
presence of gunfire also did not appear valid (i. e. � =  
. 067, t = . 928, E > . 05, one-tailed) . For the 24-hour time 
frame, residents' reports did not appear to be valid 
indicators of recorded gunfire. (See Table 10) . 
Similarly, for the 24 hour time frame, none of the 
weather variables were considered statistically significant 
indicators of recorded gunfire (e < . 05) . (See Table 11) . 
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Table 10 . ARIMA 2 :  Gunshots During 2 4  Hours and Residents' 
Responses (N = 58) 
Variables in the Model : 
B SEB T-RATIO APPROX . PROB . 
SARl . 2 2 97 7 9 6  . 12 5 95 4 6  1 .  8 2 4 30 4 0  . 07 38 5 4 1 6  
SAR2 - . 0208277  . 13 6 7 4 2 0  - . 1 52 3 1 3 8  . 8 7 9528 91 
SAR3 . 4 62 65 2 8  . 1 8 8 97 92 2 . 4 4 8 1 67 4  . 0 1 7 7 6 90 9  
avereport - . 2 9952 92 2 . 3131764  - . 12 94 8 8 3  . 8 97 4 7 08 9 
%hearing . 0 668 92 2  . 07 2 0 7 98 . 92 8 02 8 9  . 35768 037 
CONSTANT 9 . 5 8 4 7 17 7  4 . 22 9 6334  2 . 2 66087 1  . 02763568  
Unstandardi zed coefficients for variables , B and unstandardized 
coefficients for estimated standard errors , -SEB; seasonal 
autocorrelation lag 1 ,  SARl ; seasonal autocorrelation 
lag 2 ,  SAR2 ; seasonal autocorrelation lag 3 ,  SAR3 ; e < . 05 ,  one-tailed . 
Table 11.  ARIMA 3 :  Gunshots During 2 4  Hours and Weather 
Variables (N•58) 
Variables in the Model : 
B SEB T-RATIO APPROX . PROB . 
SARl . 24 6433  . 1 5 9 8 0 0  1 .  5 4 2 134 9 . 12 93 4 6 68 
SAR2 - . 0 4 38 12  . 1 628 5 8  - . 2 690172  . 7 8 9023 4 3  
SAR3 . 34 7 8 7 4  . 2 035 4 9  1 .  7 0 904 4 2  . 0 9364374  
hightemp - . 2 9 6 4 2 4  . 4 228 08 - . 7 0 10853  . 4 8 64 9999  
lowtemp . 34 67 8 8  . 4 05503  . 8 552047  . 39651738  
rain -10 . 03007 9 5 . 0 6224 3  - 1 . 98 13508  . 05306433  
CONSTANT 17 . 271 677  22 . 64 2 62 9  . 7 62 7 9 4 7  . 4 4 91 697 8 
Unstandardi zed coefficients for variables , B and unstandardized 
coefficients for estimated standard errors , -SEB; seasonal 
autocorrelation lag 1 ,  SARl ; seasonal autocorrelation 
lag 2 ,  SAR2 ; seasonal autocorrelation lag 3, SAR3 ; e < . 05 ,  two-tailed . 
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For the 24 hour time frame, weather variables were not 
considered reliable predictors of gunfire for the entire 
day. 
Identification of Night Recorded Gunfire Counts 
The pattern of autocorrelations for night gunfire was 
similar to the patterns for the 24-hour time frame of 
gunfire. The autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation 
functions identified statistically significant seasonal 
autocorrelations at lags two and three (see Figures 6. 4 and 
6. 5) . As with the 24-hour time frame of gunfire 
recordings, periodicity was seven days. These results 
suggested an ARIMA (0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) model. The results of 
fitting this model are shown in Table 12. Using this ARIMA 
model for night recorded gunfire the Box Ljung statistics 
for the ACF function were statistically nonsignificant for 
all lags. As seen in Table 12, the lag two (SAR2) and lag 
three (SAR3) seasonal autocorrelations were statistically 
significant (E < . 05, two-tailed) . The ARIMA 
(0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) model appeared to account for the process 
generating the errors for night-recorded gunfire. 
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Table 12 . ARIMA 4 :  Night Gunshots ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) ( 3 , 0 , 0 ) 
Model 
Model Description : 
Variable :  gunshots recorded during night ( 5 : 0 1 p . m .  to 12 : 00 a . rn .  
Length o f  Seasonal Cycle : 7 days 
B SEB 
Variables in the Model : 
SARl . 05 91 1 4 2  . 1328227  
SAR2 . 31 5 5 978  . 13 1 62 1 1  
SAR3 . 3920438  . 177017 0  
CONSTANT 6 . 30 998 4 5  2 . 5 96 4 872  
T-RATIO 
. 4 4 50 609  
2 . 397 77 4 3  
2 . 2 1 4 7242  
2 . 4 302005  
APPROX . PROB . 
. 65 8 0224 3  
. 01 99 1 673 
. 03094 047  
. 01 8 3 8 0 94 
Unstandardized coefficients for variable s ,  B and unstandardized 
coefficients for estimated standard errors , -SEB ; seasonal 
autocorrelation lag 1 ,  SARl ; seasonal autocorrelation 
lag 2 ,  SAR2 ; seasonal autocorrelation lag 3 ,  SAR3 ; e < . 05 ,  two-tailed . 
As indicated by Figures 6. 6 and 6. 7, the ARIMA 
(0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) model appeared to account for the errors 
generated by the seasonal autocorrelations. 
Gunfire Between 5 : 01 p . m .  and 12 : 00 a . m .  
ShotSpotter recordings indicated that 53. 14% of the 
total recorded gunshots for a day occurred between 5: 01 
p. m. and 12:00 a. m. (M = 3. 81, SD = 7. 80) . It was predicted 
that people's reports of gunfire might be related to the 
time of day the shots were recorded. To further clarify the 
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recorded counts of gunfire, the following two analyses were 
relationship between residents' responses about gunfire and 
conducted. The dependent variable was recorded gunshots 
occurring between 5:01 p. m. and 12:00 a. m. The independent 
variables of interest were residents' reports about gunfire 
in the last 24 hours. In keeping with the hypothesis that a 
positive relationship existed between residents' responses 
and recorded gunfire, directional hypotheses were tested. 
With the ARIMA (0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) function controlling for the 7 
day periodicity, the following ARIMA analyses were 
conducted: 
ARIMA 5. DV: Area B night gunfire recordings 
IV: Average number of gunshots reported by 
residents; 
ARIMA 6. DV: Area B night gunfire recordings 
IV: Percentage of residents reporting the 
presence of gunfire; 
ARIMA 7. DV: Area B night gunfire recordings 
IV: Low temperature 
IV: High temperature 
IV: Precipitation 
ARIMA 8. DV: Area B night gunfire recordings 
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IV: Percentage of residents reporting the 
presence of gunfire 
IV: High temperature 
IV: Precipitation-
Results from ARIMA 5 are shown in Table 13. As 
indicated, the relationship between the average number of 
gunshots reported and ShotSpotter counts did not appear 
statistically significant. When controlling for seasonal 
autocorrelations, the average number of gunshots reported by 
residents did not appear to be a valid predictor of the 
number of gunshots recorded (� = 1. 72, t = 1. 70, E > . OS, 
one-tailed) . 
The results from ARIMA 6 indicated that the percentage 
of persons reporting the presence of gunfire was a 
statistically significant predictor of the presence of night 
gunshots. When controlling for seasonal autocorrelations, 
the percentage of people reporting the presence of gunfire 
appeared to be a valid predictor of the presence of night 
gunfire (i. e. � =  . 070, ! = 2. 28, E < . 05, one-tailed) . 
(See Table 14) . 
For · the hours between 5:01 p. m. and 12:00 a. m. , the 
absence of precipitation appeared to be a statistically 
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Table 13 . ARIMA 5 :  Average Gunshots Reported (N = 58)  
Variables in the Model : 
Dependent variable : Gunshots recorded during night ( 5 : 01 p . m .  to 
12 : 00 a . m . ) 
B SEB T-RATIO APPROX . PROB . 
SARl . 0 990359  . 1 4 7 11 33 . 673194 6 . 503804 60 
SAR2 . 30334 91  . 1 4 0 1 4 5 9  2 . 1 64 5230  . 03503725  
SAR3 . 353 4 431  . 1 98 6623 1 .  7 7 91 1 5 5  . 08 10 65 94 
ave report 1 .  7 1 90422  1 .  0 1 11360 1 . 7 001097 . 095084  94 
CONSTANT 5 . 5 4 17319  2 .  623 1 1 97 2 . 1 12 64 93 . 03945082  
Unstandardized coefficients for variables ,  B and unstandardi zed 
coefficients for estimated standard errors , -SEB; seasonal 
autocorrelation lag 1, SARl ; seasonal autocorrelation lag 2, SAR2 ; 
seasonal autocorrelation lag 3 ,  SAR3 ; E < . 05 ,  one-tailed . 
Table 14.  ARIMA 6 :  Percentage of People Reporting Gunfire 
Present (N 58) 
Variables in the Model : 
Dependent variable : Gunshots recorded during night ( 5 : 01 p . m .  to 
12 : 00 . a . m . ) 
B SEB T-RATIO APPROX . PROB . 
SARl . 0 857177  . 1320905  . 648 931 5  . 5 1 9 1 8 4 8 2  
SAR2 . 27 7334 1 . 132934 8 2 . 0 862 4 0 9  . 04 17 8 4 94 
SAR3 . 4 068705  . 17 4 3 6 61 2 . 3334266  . 02 34 5 187  
%hearing . 0 698 68 1 . 03062 64 2 . 2 8 13056  . 02 657561  
CONSTANT 3 . 7 94 8 022 2 . 8077974  1 .  3515228  . 1 822 68 62 
Unstandardized coefficients for variables , B and unstandardized 
coefficients for estimated standard errors , -SEB; seasonal 
autocorrelation lag 1, SARl ; seasonal autocorrelation 
lag 2 ,  SAR2 ; seasonal autocorrelation lag 3, SAR3 ; E < . 05 ,  one-tailed . 
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significant predictor of recorded night gunfire (i. e. 
B = -6. 63, ! = -2. 34, E < . 05, two-tailed) . (See Table 15) . 
The ARIMA 8 analysis further examined the percentage of 
people reporting the presence of gunfire when controlling 
for seasonal autocorrelations, high temperature, and 
precipitation. The percentage of people reporting the 
presence of gunfire was again statistically significant 
(i. e. � =  . 087, t = 2. 78, E < . 05) . As indicated by Tables 
14 and 16, regardless of what independent variables were 
included in the model, the percentage of residents reporting 
Table 15. ARIMA 7 :  Weather Variables and Night Recorded 
Gunfire (N = 58) 
Variables in the Model : 
Dependent variable : Gunshots recorded during night ( 5 : 0 1 p . m .  to 12 : 00 
a . m . } 
B 
SARl . 1 4 90 8 9  
SAR2 . 3 1 5 6 68 
SAR3 . 2 4 7 3 10 
lowtemp . 2 03014  
hightemp - . 379915  
rain -6 . 625 9 4 5  
CONSTANT 2 6 . 739945  
SEB 
. 150121  
. 1 4 8 66 9  
. 1 97 983  
. 23132 6 
. 2 4 5 0 4 9  
2 . 8 3 4 4 5 2  
13 . 1 0 1 2 4 7  
T-RATIO 
. 9 93122 4  
2 . 1 232 90 1 
1 . 2 4 91 4 8 3  
. 8 77 607 6 
- 1 . 5503614  
-2 . 337 6 4 5 8  
2 . 0 4 1022 9 
APPROX . PROB . 
. 3254 3235  
. 03 8 7 0 1 6 1  
. 2 17 4 2 7 3 1  
. 38 4 3 5 4 2 9  
. 12736195  
. 02 34 4 8 9 4  
. 0 4 654 4 8 1  
Unstandardized coefficients for variables , B and unstandardized 
coefficients for estimated standard errors , -SEB; seasonal 
autocorrelation lag 1 ,  SARl ; seasonal autocorrelation 
lag 2 ,  SAR2 ; seasonal autocorrelation lag 3, SAR3 ; p �. 0 5 ,  two-tailed . 
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'l'ab1e 1 6 .  ARIMA 8 :  Percentage of Peop1e Reporting Gunfire 
Present and Weather 
Variables in the Model : 
B 
SARl . 1 95968  
SAR2 . 27 1 1 4 4  
SAR3 . 2 4 8 68 8  
hightem - . 27 8 57 4  
rain -5 . 34 9 4 4 9  
%hearing . 08 6 95 6 
CONSTANT 27 . 5 8 1572  
Variab1es 
SEB 
. 1 65152  
. 15 4 7 17 
. 20 8 0 8 6 
. 14 9958  
2 . 2 98 961  
. 03 1230 
12 . 4 12727 
{N = 58) 
T-RATIO 
1 . 1 8 658 98  
1 .  7 525240  
1 . 1 95 1224  
-1 .  8 5 7 68 4 0  
-2 . 32 6 8 98 8  
2 . 7 8 4 35 4 2  
2 . 2220398  
APPROX . PROB . 
. 2 4 1 1 10 8 9  
. 08 5 9392 6 
. 2377 9164  
. 069228 2 3  
. 02 4 1 4770  
. 007601 4 8 
. 03092951  
* Unstandardi zed coefficients for variables , � and unstandardi zed 
coefficients for estimated standard errors , SEB ; seasonal 
autocorrelation lag 1 ,  SARl ; seasonal autocorrelation 
lag 2 ,  SAR2 ; seasonal autocorrelation lag 3 ,  SAR3 ; p � . 05 ,  two-tailed . 
the presence of night gunfire remained statistically 
significant. In addition, the independent variable, 
percentage of people reporting the presence of gunfire, 
seemed relatively insensitive to the autocorrelation 
structure of night recorded gunfire. For example, analyses 
computed with an ARIMA (5, 1, 1) (3, 0, 0) model were also 
statistically significant (p < . 05) . The percentage of 
residents reporting the presence of gunfire appeared to be a 
robust predictor of the presence of night gunfire. 
The weather variable, absence of precipitation, again 
appeared to be a predictor of recorded gunshots (B 
t = -2. 33, p < . 05) . The variables high and low 
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-5. 35, 
temperatures were probably influenced by the time of year 
data were collected. The 59 nights of data collection 
occurred during late spring and early summer. Many 
replications of this and similar studies are needed to 
better understand the predictive value of different weather 
variables in different locations 
The assumption of independence of observations was 
addressed by the ARIMA (0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) function controlling 
for seasonal autocorrelations as indicated by Figures 6. 6 
and 6. 7. In addition, the Durbin-Watson statistic was 1. 9 
suggesting that independence of observations concerns were 
sufficiently addressed by the ARIMA (0, 0, 0) (3, 0, 0) model. 
The assumption of a normal distribution of residuals was 
supported by the Kolmogorov Smirnov test, as did the Q-Q 
plot, which appeared linear. (See Table 17 and Figure 6. 8) . 
The time sequence plot indicated that the variance of the Y 
score was relatively uniform for values of X as indicated by 
Figure 6. 9. The assumption of homoscedasticity did not 
appear to be substantially violated. 
To further examine the relationships between the 
dependent variables, Area B night recorded gunfire, and 
independent variables, Pearson Correlations and Spearman's 
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Table 17. Kolmogorav-Smirnov Test for Normal Distribution 
of Night Recorded Gunfire Residuals 
Normal 
Parameters 
( a , b) 
Most Extreme 
Differences 
Mean 
Std . Deviation 
Absolute 
Positive 
Negative 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z 
Asymp . Sig . ( 2-tailed ) 
Exact Sig . ( 2-tailed ) 
Point Probability 
a Test distribut ion is Normal . 
b Calculated from data . 
Residuals 
for Night 
Recorded 
Gunfire 
. 6 1 2 838 8  
7 . 0263435  
9 
. 1 4 2  
. 1 4 2  
- . 070  
1 . 0 6 6  
. 2 0 6  
. 3 1 9  
. 000  
rho Correlations were computed. Since the raw ShotSpotter 
data used in the correlations contained autocorrelations, 
only the parameter estimates were considered unbiased. The 
tests of statistical significance were considered to be 
seriously 
affected by the autocorrelation structure of the recorded 
gunfire data. 
As indicated by Table 18, the Pearson Correlation 
parameter for average number of gunshots recorded and night 
recorded gunfire was . 298. The parameter for the percentage 
154 
Table 18.  Pearson Correlations between Area B Night 
Recorded Gunfire and Residents' Reports of Gunshots 
How many 
gunshots were 
recorded for 
the interview 
night ? 
Pearson 
Correlation 
Sig . ( 1-tailed) 
N 
What is the Pearson 
average number Correlation 
of shots 
reported for 
the day? 
Sig . ( 1-tailed) 
N 
What percentage Pearson 
of residents Correlation 
reported the 
presence of 
gunshots ?  
Sig . ( 1-tailed) 
N 
How many 
gunshots 
were 
recorded 
for the 
interview 
night ? 
1 
5 9  
. 2 98 ( * )  
. 0 12  
57 
. 3 4 9 { * )  
. 00 4  
5 8  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (I-tailed). 
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of people reporting the presence of gunfire was . 34 9. The 
tests of statistical significance indicated that both 
correlations were statistically significant, but the . 
autoco�relation structure of the data made those results 
questionable. 
The Spearman's rho correlation indicated that the 
parameter for average number of gunshots reported was . 172. 
The Spearman's rho parameter for the percentage of people 
· reporting the presence of gunfire was . 207. Neither 
correlation was considered statistically significant. (See 
Table 19) . 
As indicated in Table 20, the Pearson correlation 
between Area B night-recorded gunfire and weather indicated 
that the parameter for high temperature was -. 04 1 and the 
parameter for low temperature was -. 058.  The parameter for 
precipitation was -. 345 and was considered statistically 
significant. The Spearman's rho correlation parameter for 
high temperature was -. 002 and the parameter for low 
temperature was -. 107 (see Table 21) . The parameter for 
precipitation was -. 444 and was considered statistically 
significant. Again, all of the correlation tests of 
1 5 6  
Tab1e 1 9 . Spearman' s  rho Correlations between Area B Night 
Recorded Gunfire and Residents' Reports of Gunshots 
Spearman ' s rho How many 
gunshots were 
recorded for 
the interview 
night? 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Sig . ( 1-
tailed ) 
N 
What is the Correlation 
average number Coefficient 
of shots 
reported for 
the day? 
What 
percentage of 
residents 
reported the 
presence of  
gunshots ? 
Sig . ( 1-
tailed) 
N 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Sig . ( 1-
tailed) 
N 
How many 
gunshots 
were 
recorded 
for the 
interview 
night? 
1 . 000  
59  
. 1 72  
. 1 00 
57 
. 2 07  
. 0 60 
58 
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Table 20 . Pearson Correlations between Area B Night 
Recorded Gunfire and Weather Variables 
How many 
gunshots 
were 
recorded 
for the 
interview 
ni2ht ? 
How many Pearson 
gunshots were Correlation 
recorded for 1 
the interview 
night ? 
Sig . ( 2-
tailed) 
N 5 9  
What is the Pearson 
high Correlation - . 0 4 1  temperature 
for the day? 
Sig . ( 2- . 7 65 tailed) 
N 57  
What is the Pearson 
low Correlation - . 0 58  temperature 
for the day? 
Sig . ( 2- . 6 67 tailed) 
N 
57 
Was Pearson 
precipitation Correlation 
presence 
- . 3 4 5 ( * * ) during the 
interview 
time? 
Sig . ( 2-
. 007  tailed) 
N 5 9  
* *  Correlation i s  signi ficant at the 0 . 0 1 level ( 2-tailed) . 
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Table 2 1 . Spearman' s rho Correlations between Area B Night 
Recorded Gunfire and Weather Variables 
Spearman ' s  
rho 
How many 
gunshots were 
recorded for 
the interview 
night ? 
What is the 
high 
temperature 
for the day? 
What is the 
low 
temperature 
for the day? 
Was 
precipitat ion 
presence 
during the 
interview 
time ? 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Sig . ( 2 -
tailed)  
N 
Correlation 
Coe fficient 
Sig . ( 2 -
tailed) 
N 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Sig . ( 2-
tailed ) 
N 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Sig . ( 2 -
tailed ) 
N 
How many 
gunshots 
were 
recorded 
for the 
interview 
night ? 
1 . 00 0  
5 9  
- . 002  
. 98 7  
5 7  
- . 1 0 7  
. 4 27  
57  
- . 4 4 4 { * * )  
. 000  
5 9  
* * Correlation is  significant at the 0 . 0 1 level ( 2-tailed ) . 
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statistical significance should be regarded with much 
caution due to the autocorrelation structure of the recorded 
gunfire data. 
Identification of the Early Morning Recorded Gunfire Counts 
In order to examine the relationships between 
residents' reports of gunfire and gunfire recorded during 
the early morning hours (12:01 a. m. to 5:00 a. m. ) ,  a 
diagnosis of the dependent variable for autocorrelations was 
needed. The patterns of autocorrelations for the early 
morning gunfire were very different from the gunshot 
patterns for night-time and 24 hour time frames. As 
indicated in Figures 6. 10 and 6. 11, the autocorrelation and 
partial autocorrelation functions indicated a lag one 
autocorrelation. As suggested by the residual analysis, the 
results of which are shown in Figures 6. 12 and 6. 13, the 
autocorrelations could be adequately modeled with an ARIMA 
(1, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) model. The lag one autocorrelation (ARl)  in 
ARIMA (1, 0, 0) (0, 0, 0) was considered statistically 
significant (p < . 05) . (See Table 22) . 
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Table 22 . ARIMA Model for Morning Gunshots ( 1 , 0 , 0 ) ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) 
(N • 60) 
Model Description : 
Variable :  gunshots recorded during early morning ( 12 : 01 a . m .  to 5 : 00 
a . m . } 
No seasonal component in model . 
Variables in the Model : 
ARl 
CONSTANT 
B 
. 2 8272 92 
5 . "63 82562 
SEB 
. 12 5 9522 
1 .  6857 987  
T-RATIO APPROX . PROB . 
2 . 2 4 4 7 3 4 2  
3 . 34 4 5 607 
. 02 8 614 22  
. 0014 4 91 4  
Unstandardized coefficients for variables ,  B and unstandardized 
coefficients for estimated standard errors , -SEB; autocorrelation lag 1 ,  
(ARl } ; p � . 05 , two-tailed . 
Gunfire Between 12 : 01 a . m .  and 5 : 00 a . m .  
During the data collection time frame, ShotSpotter 
recordings indicated that 45. 20% of the total recorded 
gunshots occurred between 12:01 a. m. and 5:00 a. m. (� = 3, 
1 8, SD = 7. 7 3) . It was predicted that the validity of 
people's reports might be affected by the time of day 
gunshots were recorded. To further examine the relationship 
between residents' responses about early morning gunfire and 
recorded counts of gunfire, the following analyses were 
conducted. The dependent variable was the total recorded 
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gunshots occurring between 12:01 a. m. and 5:00 a. m. The 
independent variables were residents' reports about gunfire 
in the last 24 hours. With the ARIMA function controlling 
for autocorrelations, the following ARIMA analyses were 
conducted: 
ARIMA 10. DV: Area B early morning gunfire recordings 
IV: Average number of gunshots reported by 
residents; 
ARIMA 11. DV: Area B early morning gunfire recordings 
IV: Percentage of residents reporting the 
presence of gunfire; 
ARIMA 12. DV: Area B early morning gunfire recordings 
IV: High temperature 
IV: Low temperature 
IV: Precipitation-
As indicated in Tables 23 and 24, residents' reports 
were not statistically significant predictors of early 
morning gunshots. When controlling for autocorrelations, 
gunshot numbers reported by residents were not valid 
predictors of morning gunfire (i. e. B -. 06, ! = -. 043, e > 
. 05, one-tailed) . When controlling for autocorrelations, 
the percentage of people reporting the presence of gunfire, 
166 
Tabla 23 . ARIMA 10 : Early Morning (N =59) 
Variables in the Model : 
Dependent variable : gunshots recorded during early morning ( 12 : 0 1  a . m .  
t o  5 : 00 a . m . ) 
ARl 
ave report 
CONSTANT 
B 
. 2 68 4 7 8 0  
- . 05 91287  
5 . 8 2 4 3703  
SEB 
. 130137 6 
1 . 3837 685  
1 .  9 15 3 4 8 2  
T-RATIO 
2 . 0 6303 1 9  
- . 0 427302 
3 . 0 4 08 937 
APPROX . PROB . 
. 0 4 38 4 320  
. 9 6607 139  
. 00360894  
Unstandardi zed coefficients for variables ,  B and unstandardi zed 
coefficients for estimated standard errors , -SEB ; autocorrelation lag 1 ,  
(ARl ) ; p �. 05 , one-tailed . 
-
-
Tabla 24 . ARIMA 11 : Early Morning (N =59) 
Variables in the Model : 
Dependent variable : gunshots recorded during early morning ( 12 : 0 1 a . m .  
to 5 : 00 a . m . ) 
Variables in the Model : 
ARl 
percent 
CONSTANT 
. 2782 662 
. 0000542  
5 . 7 320869  
B SEB 
. 1287 612  
. 0 4 0 2 128  
2 . 294 6022 
T-RATIO 
2 . 1611029  
. 00 1 3 4 67 
2 . 4 98 0 7 4 4  
APPROX . PROB . 
. 03 4 97 8 9 6 
. 998 93030 
. 0 1 5 4 5011  
Unstandardi zed coefficients for variables , B and unstandardized 
coefficients for estimated standard errors , -SEB ; autocorrelation lag 1 ,  
(ARl ) ;  p �. 05 , one-tailed . 
--
167 
did not appear to be a valid predictor of the presence of 
early morning recorded gunshots (i. e. B = . 0001, t = . 001, 
p > . 05, one-tailed) . Neither xesidents' reports of the 
number of gunshots Q� the percentages of persons reporting 
the presence of gunfire were valid indicators of early 
morning gunfire recordings. 
Perhaps the lack of validity for residents identifying 
the presence of gunfire in early morning was due to 
traditional sleep patterns. Most people were perhaps 
sleeping between 12:01 a. m. and 5:00 a. m. As indicated by 
Figure 6. 14, gunfire appeared to be a problem for some early 
morning time frames. Perhaps questions indicating the 
presence. of early morning gunfire should include references 
to patterns of sleep and gunshot disturbances of sleep. As 
a general question, 96. 7% of the respondents did indicate 
that gunfire had bothered their sleep. The relationships of 
these sleep disturbances to early morning gunshots were not 
addressed in this study. 
The direction of this study was to evaluate the 
validity of residents' gunfire reports when compared with 
gunfire recordings for a particular day. Other factors that 
perhaps impacted the validity of responses included the 
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residents' proximity to the source of the gunfire, how aware 
individuals were of sounds while sleeping, and the number of 
hours individual spent . in the home. The responses . from some 
subsets of the population of residents may have had greater 
validity than the responses from other subsets within the 
population. 
The ARIMA weather analysis indicated that absence of 
precipitation appeared to be a predictor of recorded 
gunshots (B = -8.13, t = -2.43, p < .05) . As indicated in 
Table 25, the variables of high and low temperatures 
appeared statistically nonsignificant. It would be 
interesting to compare those results with weather analyses 
from times of the year with more extreme temperature 
readings. The high temperature for the data collection time 
frame had a mean of 8 1.9, median of 82, and mode of 8 2. The 
low temperatures had a mean of 62.97, median of 64, and mode 
of 67. 
Table 25 . ARIMA 12 : Early Morning Gunfire and Weather 
(N =58) 
Variables in the Model : 
ARl 
lowtemp 
hightemp 
rain 
CONSTANT 
17 0 
B 
. 2 7 1 1 93 
. 35 0 1 61 
. 02 2 4 5 6  
- 8 . 1 2 8 6 94 
- 1 5 . 6 63577 
SEB 
. 1337 8 4  
. 30 964 8 
. 332261  
3 . 34 4 68 3  
1 9 . 5 8 1 4 0 2  
T-RATIO APPROX . PROB . 
2 . 0270955 . 0 4 7 6 9553  
1 . 1308 377 . 2 632 1 4 7 5  
. 0 6758 4 8  . 9 4 637 047  
-2 . 4 303330 . 0 1850331 
- . 7 9 992 1 1  . 4 2732737 
Emergency Calls for Help 
Emergency calls to the Emergency Management Center for 
gun related concerns and assaults totaled 57 calls. The 
calls for gun related concerns followed a very clear 
pattern: they occurred only when a person was shot or in 
danger of being shot, or when personal property was being 
damaged. There were no calls for hearing gunfire in the 
distance. In addition, calls were not made to report 
someone randomly shooting into the sky. There were calls 
from ·1ocations outside of Area A and Area B about hearing 
random gunfire. Those locations did not appear to have a 
history of moderate gunfire activity. 
There were 13 calls reporting that someone had been 
shot or was being shot at, or that personal property was 
being damaged by someone' s shooting. The information 
available to the public from emergency calls was very 
limited. Details regarding what happened at the locations 
reporting gunfire were not available. The hypotheses were 
made that 911 calls about gunfire would correlate to 
individual reports of gunfire and to recorded counts of 
gunfire. As indicated in Table 26, the results from two­
tailed Pearson and Spearman' s rho correlation analyses 
171 
Table 2 6 . Relationship of Recorded Gunfire and 911 Calls 
for Gunfire (Two-tailed) 
Pearson 
Correlation 
For this day, 
how many 9 1 1  
calls for 
' gunshots were 
received? 
Sig . ( 2-tai led ) 
N 
- -
Spearman' s  rho 
For this day, 
how many 9 1 1  
1 calls for 
, gunshots were 
received? 
; sig . { 2-
tailed) 
N 
- -
172 
How many 
gunshots were 
I recorded for the 
interview night ? 
- . 15 4  
. 2 4 5  
5 9  
I 
How many gunshots 
were recorded for 
the interview I 
night? 
- . 1 9 6 ; I 
. 1 37  
59 
indicated no statistically significant relationship between 
911 calls regarding gunfire and recorded gunfire. Again, 
correlations were only computed for Area B due to the lack 
of vari�bility in Area A. 
Another hypothesis of the study was that residents' 
reports of gunfire would have a higher correlation with 
gunfire than with 911 gunfire calls. As indicated in Table 
27, resident reports appeared to have a statistically 
significant Pearson correlation with recorded gunfire (p < 
. 05) , but not with 911 gunfire calls {p > . 05) . Neither 
residents' reports nor 911 gunfire calls had a statistically 
significant Spearrnan's rho correlation (p < . 05) . Due to 
the autocorrelations in the recorded gunfire data, tests of 
significance could be seriously biased. The possibility of 
Type I errors increased with positive autocorrelations and 
the possibility of Type II errors increased with negative 
autocorrelations. Pearson correlation parameters for 
variables were 911 gunfire calls, -. 154; percentage of 
residents reporting the presence of gunfire, . 349; and 
number of gunshots reported, . 298. As indicated in Table 
28, the Spearman's rho parameters for variables were as 
follows: 911 gunfire calls, -. 196; percentage of residents 
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Table 2 7 .  Pearson Correlations between Residents' Reports , 
911 Calls for Gunfire, and Recorded Gunfire (N = 59)  
What i s  
the How many For this 
average What gunshots day, how 
number of percentage were many 911  
shots of residents recorded calls for 
reported reported the for the gunshots 
for the presence of interview were 
day? gunfire?  night? received? 
What is  Pearson 
the Correlation 
average 
number of 1 . 665 ( * )  . 2 98 ( * )  . 008  
shots 
reported 
for the 
day? 
S ig .  ( 2 - . 000 . 025 . 950  
tailed) 
What Pearson 
percentage Correlation 
of 
residents 
reported . 665 ( * )  1 . 34 9 ( * )  - . 08 3  
the 
presence 
of 
gunfire? 
Sig . ( 2 - . 000 . 007 . 51 6  tailed) 
Pearson . 2 98 ( * )  . 34 9 ( * )  1 - . 154  Correlation 
S ig .  ( 2 - . 025  . 007 . 2 4 5  tailed )  
For this  Pearson 
day,  how Correlation 
many 9 1 1  
calls  for . 008 - . 083  - . 154  1 
gunshots 
were 
received? 
S ig .  ( 2 - . 950 . 51 6  . 2 4 5  tailed ) 
* Correlation is signi ficant at the 0 . 05 level (2-tailed) . 
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Table 28 . Spearman' s  rho Correlations between 
Residents' Reports , 911 Calls for Gunfire , and 
Recorded Gunfire (N = 59 ) 
What For this 
What is percentage day,  how 
the of How many many 9 1 1  
average residents gunshots calls  
number reported were for 
of shots the recorded gunshots 
reported presence for the were 
for the of interview received 
day? gunfire? night? ? 
What is Correlation 
the Coefficient 
average 
number of 1 . 000 . 770 ( * )  . 172  . 025  shots 
reported 
for the 
day? 
Sig . ( 2 - . 000 . 20 1  . 8 45  tailed) 
What Correlation 
percentag Coefficient 
e of 
residents .,r .,;'I • ,  
reported . 77 0 ( * )  1 . 000 . 207 - . 030 
the 
presence 
of 
gunfire?  
Sig . ( 2- . 000 . 119  . 8 1 7  tailed) 
How many Correlation 
gunshots Coefficient 
were 
recorded . 17 2  . 207  1 . 000 - . 1 9 6  
for the 
interview 
night? 
S ig .  ( 2- . 201 . 11 9  . 1 37 tailed) 
For this Correlation 
day, how Coefficient 
many 911  
calls for . 02 5  - . 030  - . 1 9 6  1 . 000  
gunshots 
were 
received? 
Sig . ( 2- . 8 4 5  . 817  . 137 tailed) . 
• Correlation is significant at the 0 . 05 level ( 2-tailed) . 
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reporting the presence of gunfire, . 207; and number of 
gunshots reported, . 17 2. 
From areas A and B, there were 44 calls reporting 
assault. The hypothesis that residents' reports of gunfire 
were correlated to reported assaults was not supported. A 
thought was that a willingness to report gunfire to an 
interviewer might be correlated with calling for emergency 
help when someone was assaulted. This hypothesis was not 
supported as shown by Tables 29 and 30. The results from 
the Pearson and Spearman' s rho correlatibns procedures (p > 
. 05) were not statistically significant. 
Summary of Results 
The results of this study indicate that the percentage 
of residents reporting the presence of gunfire was a valid 
predictor of night gunfire. The greater the percentage of 
people reporting gunfire, the greater the number of night 
gunshots recorded by ShotSpotter. Residents' reports of the 
actual number of gunshots were not valid. Residents also 
identified certain patterns of gunfire in their 
neighborhood. Gunfire was more apt to occur at night and on 
Saturday. 
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Table 2 9 . Pearson Correlations between Residents' Gunfire 
Reports and 911 Assault Calls 
I 
How many 
911  calls  I 
for 
I assault 
were 
received? 
How many 9 1 1  Pearson 
calls for Correlation ! 
: assault were 1 
received? 
Sig . ( 2-tailed ) . 
I N 64 
What is  the Pearson 
average number Correlation I of shots I - . 032 
reported for 
the day? 
Sig . ( 2-ta il-ed ) . 8 07  
N 62 
1What percentage Pearson 
of  residents Correlation 
reported the . 0 17  
presence of  
. gu_nfire ? 
Sig . ( 2-tailed )  . 8 92 ! 
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Table 30 . Spearman' s  rho Correlations between Residents'  
Gunfire Reports and 911 Assault Calls 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I I 
I 
Spearman ' s  
- - . 
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rho 
-- --
How many 91 1 
calls  for 
assault were 
received? 
I 
What is  t he 
average numb�r 
of shots 
reported for 
the day?  
I 
1 What 
percentage of 
residents 
reported the 
presence of 
gunfire? 
I 
I 
--
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Sig . ( 2-
tailed} 
N 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
Sig . ( 2-
tailed) 
N 
Correlation 
Coefficient 
- -
Sig . ( 2-
tailed) 
N 
. -
How many 
911  calls 
for 
assault 
were 
received? 
1 . 000  
. 
64  
- . 0 0 6  
. 96 1  
6 2  
. 0 15  
. 907  
63 
As indicated by the limited publicly available 911 
information, calls for help were related to a person being 
shot, in danger of being shot, or personal property being 
damaged. Calls were not made for random gunfire such as 
when someone fired a rapid succession of shots into the air. 
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CHAPTER VI 
· Discussion and Xmp1ications 
This chapter discusses the hypotheses of this study, 
limitations of the study, and implications for future 
research, policy, and practice. 
Research Hypotheses 
The first hypothesis of this study was that a positive 
relationship existed between recorded counts of gunfire and 
individuals' reports of gunfire. The hypothesis was 
supported in the following ways. The relationship between 
residents_' reports of the presence of gunfire and 
ShotSpotter counts of night gunfire was statistically 
significant. The percentage of people reporting the 
presence of gunfire was a valid indicator of recorded night 
gunshots. In addition, data from interviews and ShotSpotter 
indicated that Saturday was the day of the week with the 
highest level of gunfire. Both data sources also identified 
night as the time of day when gunfire was more likely. 
The residents' reports of the actual number of gunshots 
in the previous 24 hours were not valid. Previous gunshot 
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recordings and lack of precipitation were indicators of the 
actual number of shots. 
The second hypothesis was that a relationship existed 
between recorded counts of gunfire and 911 calls about 
gunfire. This hypothesis was not supported. Emergency 
calls indicated that someone was shot, or in danger of being 
shot, or that personal property was being damaged. It 
appeared that people did not call in response to random 
gunfire. Calls were related to personal hurt or damage. 
What appeared to be a reluctance to report gunfire was 
consistent with the findings by Travis (1996) that people 
often do not report violence out of fear of retaliation. 
The third hypothesis predicted that individual reports 
of gunfire would have a higher correlation with recorded 
gunfire than with 911 gunshot calls. This hypothesis was 
supported. Residents' reports of the presence of gunfire 
were a valid indicator of the presence of recorded gunfire. 
The correlation between recorded gunshots and 911 calls was 
not statistically significant. 
The fourth hypothesis predicted that a . relationship 
would exist between individuals' reports of gunfire and 
reported assaults (two-tailed). The thought was that 
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reporting actual harm to someone would be related to 
reporting gunfire� This was not supported. Perhaps part of 
the reason for this was that most of the gunfire appeared to 
be rapid successions of random gunfire with no apparent 
target, whereas assaults usually had an identified target. 
Linlitations of This Study 
As indicated earlier, this was a beginning study of the 
validity of people's reports of gunfire and recorded 
gunfire. The external validity of this study is low. Many 
replications of this and similar studies are needed for more 
conclusive results. The main internal threat to the validity 
of this study involved interrater reliability. 
Interrater Reliability of Data Collectors 
At various times this study had four different 
interviewers. The interviewers were trained regarding 
concerns for confidentiality, protection of respondents, and 
use of the instrument. The first attempt at finding 
interviewers was to have retired people conduct the 
interviews. This had much potential, but the referral 
source primarily identified people that were having 
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significant health problems and hospitalizations. The 
second attempt was to find ·stay-at-home parents. One 
interviewer was not able to continue due to a fall and 
surgeries. Another had a change in personal circumstances 
that precluded this work. A p�oblem was that most people 
wanted to conduct interviews occasionally rather than every 
day. A young adult working part-time seemed to do the best 
j ob of fitting the interviews into her schedule. Her mother 
also agreed to work as her substitute if absolutely needed. 
That interrater reliability was not computed and formally 
reported was a limitation of this study. At the beginning 
of following studies, planning for interrater reliability 
and locating a larger number of potential interviewers would 
be important. 
Similarly, interrater reliability was needed in 
evaluating the ShotSpotter data. A ShotSpotter consultant 
listened to some recordings to verify that the sounds 
recorded were gunshots . There appeared to be agreement 
among evaluators, but this was not computed and formally 
reported. No one listened to additional recordings and no 
assessment of interrater reliability was conducted. 
Recordings of distant shots were the most difficult to 
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· identify. For day and evening hours, several possible shots 
were excluded because of the possibility that they might be 
sounds related to construction work. 
In addition, having someone check to verify that the 
sounds were actually gunfire was not done. With the actual 
ShotSpotter system, a person checks to verify the presence 
of gunfire. That should only be done with a meticulously 
designed safety protocol and by trained responders working 
with the police department. That would also include the 
need for an interdisciplinary approach. That was not the 
nature of this study. 
Placement of Sensors 
As mentioned above, a concern was the placement of the 
sensor. Because of the level of break-ins in parts of the 
area, safety of equipment was a major issue. If the 
equipment had been stolen, there would have been no 
recordings. The preferred location ' for the sensor would 
have been buildings closer to the gunfire. A problem was 
that those buildings had a higher level of stolen property. 
Equipment needs to be located on buildings considered best 
for recordings purposes. Perhaps the best options for 
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placement of sensors will occur when the sensors become 
wireless. In this study, concern for safety of the 
equipment superceded locating the sensor in the best 
location for data collection. 
A second reliability concern was also related to the 
placement of sensors. At least one additional sensor was 
needed to verify the presence of a gunshot recording. 
Preferably, the sensor would be on a different building in 
the same area. This would increase the accuracy of 
determining whether a recording was· an electrical glitch or 
a gunshot recording. The impact of unreliable data reduces 
both the statistical conclusion validity and construct 
validity of this study. 
Lack of Precipitation Data 
One problem with data regarding the amount of 
precipitation was a lack of information. The closest 
National Weather Service had hourly measurements of 
precipitation, but that weather station received 
substantially more rain than the target sites . The weather 
station had a greater amount of rain as well as more 
frequent occurrences of rain. An example was that over one 
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inch was measured at that weather station, but only a trace 
was measured at the sensor site. A closer weather station 
with less equipment had precipitation totals that were more 
similar to total rain accumulation at the sites. The 
problem was that the close weather site only recorded total 
amounts for 24 hour time frames. They did, however, give a 
narrative of when precipitation occurred such as midday or 
night. 
An interview day was defined as 24 hours prior to the 
interview. This included time frames from two different 
days. Therefore, the precipitation variable in this study 
only indicated the presence of precipitation during the 
interview time. For future research purposes, a measure 
that records hourly precipitation would allow for an 
interval level variable. In this study, exact measurements 
of precipitation during the interview time frame were not 
available. 
Missing Data 
In computing the ARIMA model for the dependent 
variable, recorded gunfire, seven sequential days of data 
were missing. This missing data were addressed by extending 
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the data collection time frame by seven days. A possibility 
for dealing with the missing data would have been to have a 
mean substitution for each day of the week, but a larger 
concern was having 12% of the dependent variable missing 
from area B. The impact of having the missing week of 
gunfire recordings on the ARIMA model is not known. The 
external validity was reduced. 
The remaining missing data for the independent 
variables used in the analyses were less than 5%. The 
_ method for dealing with that . missing data was to use the 
SPSS listwise procedure. The exception was one independent 
variable that was deleted. It appeared that the question 
for that variable was poorly designed. People were asked 
how many hours they were in their home or neighborhood the 
previous day. The question was not clear, and people were 
not sure how to answer. In addition, the missing data for 
that question was 19. 3%. 
Sampling Issues 
The source for phone numbers in this study was the 
current City Directory for the identified location. People 
without telephones were not included in the sample. 
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Although a spokesperson for the City Directory stated that 
cell phone numbers were included in the directory, the 
inclusion of cell phone numbers was not evident. In 
addition, the directory included less than ten phone numbers 
for people living in public housing. Also, of the people · 
interviewed, 97. 9% had lived in their homes over three 
years. In addition, in each of the homes where interviews 
were conducted, an adult had previously interviewed with an 
employee of the City Directory. A concern is that a 
systematic bias may have existed among the people 
interviewed. The people interviewed represented a sample of 
convenience and may not be representative of the population. 
Thus, the statistical conclusion validity of the study is 
impacted and results should be viewed with caution. 
Another concern is the 19 . 14% refusal rate among people 
contacted for interviews. No attempt was made to interview 
those people in person. If the people who refused to answer 
the questions had very different viewpoints, their 
viewpoints were not indicated in the study. Again, the 
statistical conclusion validity is impacted by this lack of 
information. 
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Implications for Research 
As mentioned, no comprehensive measure of community 
violence exists. Basic to the process of developing a 
comprehensive measure of community violence is the need to 
establish the validity of indicators of community violence. 
According to Guterman, Cameron, and Staller, in the study of 
community violence, "the existing knowledge base presents a 
collection of groundbreaking studies that have documented 
the extent and the profound impact of community violence in 
young person' s lives. However, taken as a whole, the 
empirical work conducted in this area suffers from a lack of 
consensus or even explicit discussion regarding the 
parameters of 'community violence' as an important 
phenomenon of study" (2Q O O, p. 580) . The authors further 
assert the need to clarify the boundaries and perceptive 
elements involved in "violence" exposure and a need for 
specificity in clearly demarcating the parameters of 
community violence exposure. 
The most frequently quoted measure of community 
violence is the Uniform Crime Report which, according the 
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National Crime Victimization Survey, underestimates violent 
crime by 8 1% (2001) . The NCVS has a more detailed reporting 
of violent crimes, but it takes two years to complete. More 
current measurements are needed. 
Before beginning this study, several researchers ·in the 
field of community violence were contacted. Agreement was 
expressed that an indicator that gave immediate feedback on 
the presence of gunfire w?uld_ be extremely valuable. Since 
that time the ShotSpotter instrument was developed for 
identification of the actual frequency of gunshots. 
ShotSpotter appears to be a measure of community violence 
that gives immediate feedback on the presence and frequency 
of gunshots. This study provides the basis for a simple, 
current need assessment that identifies the current presence 
of night gunfire in a neighborhood. 
A simple need assessment that identifies whether night 
gunfire is present gives researchers a tool for assessing 
the current presence of gunfire. Data collection of 
residents' reports would probably be needed for at least a 
month due to cycles of gunfire activity. Levels of 
periodicity from different locations would vary. 
Generalizing the presence of gunfire from one location to 
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another would be inappropriate. Again, the percentage of 
people reporting the presence of gunfire appears to be valid 
only for the hours between 5:01 p. m. and 12:00 a. m. 
A second implication of this study is a need to further 
study the impact of gunfire on people' s sleep. Mitru, 
Millrood, and Mateika indicate that sleep deprivation 
reduces cognitive efficiency and results in decreased 
academic performance and increased behavioral problems 
(2002) . With 96. 7% of the adults (N = 331) responding that 
gunfire had bothered their sleep, more research is needed in 
this area. The impact of gunshots on the sleep patterns of 
children and adults has not been researched. This would be 
most important to children and adults living in close 
proximity to areas with frequent gunshots. 
There is also a need for further research on gunfire 
patterns. Opportunities may exist for further exploring the 
specific patterns of gunfire such as during the time frame 
between 2: 00 a. m. and 4: 00 a. m. ; on a particular day of the 
week ; with a certain range of atmospheric temperatures and 
precipitation; and with certain patterns of autocorrelations 
and seasonal autocorrelations. Undoubtedly there will 
always be unusual occurrences of gunfire that are totally 
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unexpected and unusual for the location, but some random 
gunfire patterns could perhaps be better understood. 
Implications for Policy 
A problem in some communities with gunfire is that 
policy is apt to be tailored entirely by people who do not 
live in the designated neighborhoods. If the perception is 
that people are sensationalizing the gunfire problem or that 
the problem has already been solved, concerns will be less • 
apt to be addressed. Having a simple instrument that i·s a 
valid indicator of the presence of night gunfire has the 
potential for increasing the awareness of policy makers. 
With community safety of children and their families being 
an important responsibility of the community, this study 
provides a tool for increasing awareness. 
Implications for Practice 
The implications of this study for practitioners 
include an increased awareness of the problems facing their 
clients. A common occurrence for most practitioners is 
working with children that have behavior problems. An 
example of using awareness of community gunfire presence was 
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demonstrated by one kindergarten teacher. The teacher was 
·aw��� that a particular child lived in a very chaotic 
neighborhood with frequent night gunfire. Rather than 
pushing a very tired child to concentrate and work, the 
teacher first allowed the child to nap. The result was a 
more rested child who progressed aca�emically and was well 
behaved. Rather than considering this teacher's approach as 
a lowering of standards, the teacher used a simple strategy 
that resulted in more effective programming. Having an 
increased awareness of the reality of this child's life, 
resulted in the selection of a strategy that was beneficial 
to the child. Following traditional strategies of insisting 
that the child concentrate and behave had previously 
resulted in behavior problems and a frustrating day for the 
child and teacher. 
For many children receiving special education services� 
an individualized plan is devised to meet their academic 
needs. Perhaps, for some children, the need for sleep is as 
great as the need for lunch. For children living close to 
night gunfire, this is a possible consideration. Also, as 
indicated by the periodicity of the gunfire recordings, 
additional rest may only be needed occasionally . 
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Undoubtedly, other children also have home and community 
environments that preclude getting enough r�st. Mitru, 
Millrood, and Mateika suggest a need for some ·-children 
experiencing sleep deprivation to have delayed academic 
schedules. The question is how can the child's program be 
tailored to assist the young person in developing his/her 
potential? It is interesting to note that one summer day 
camp in the targeted area included a nap time for the 
elementary and middle school age children. This program 
appeared -to have few behavior problems. 
The implications of this study for programmers 
attempting to reduce the levels of gunfire include (1) 
access to a tool indicating whether night gunshots are 
present, and (2) better use of resources to address the 
problem. For programs attempting to reduce the presence of 
night gunfire, a current indicator allows practitioners to 
regularly evaluate whether night gunfire is present. This 
could result in a more effective use of resources. 
Concluding Statement 
The responsibility for meeting the safety and academic 
needs of children is important work. It is also a huge 
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responsibility. The failures of institutions to meet those 
needs have serious consequences for both the community and 
the children. Pretending gunfire does not exist is a highly 
costly choice that effects children and their neighborhoods. 
Awareness of the presence of gunfire provides for an 
opportunity to design programs that realistically fit the 
needs of more children. 
195 
REFERENCES 
196 
Abt Associates Inc. (1994 ) . Public Housing Drug 
Elimination Program Resource Document (HUD-1478) . 
Wqshington, DC: . U. S. Government Printing Office. 
Abt Associates Inc. (1998) . Gauging the Effects of Public 
Housing Redesign, Cambridge, MA: Popkin, S. J. , Gwiada, 
V. E. , Amendolia, J. M. , Buron, L. F. , & Olson, L, M. 
Attar, B. K. , Guerra, N. G. , &  Tolan P. , H. (1994 ) . 
Neighborhood disadvantage, stressful like events, and 
adjustment in urban elementary-school children. 
Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 23, 391-400. 
Bhana, A. (1995 ) .  Experiences and perceptions of danger 
among urban adolescents (Doctoral dissertation, 
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1995 ) . 
Dissertation Abstracts International, 90. 
Bolland, J. M . .  , & Mccallum, D. M. (1998) . Predictors of 
premobilization: Discussion of health issues in public 
housing neighborhoods. Unpublished manuscript, 
University of Alabama. 
Bolland, J. M. , & Mccallum, D. M. (1998) . Preventing risk 
behaviors among inner-city adolescents: A community-
197 
ba�ed approach to risk · reduction. Unpublished 
manuscript, University of Alabama. 
Brady, T. V. (1997) . Measuring what matters part two: 
developing measures of what the police do, (NCJ-
167255) . Washington, D. C: U. S. Government Printing 
Office. 
Bureau of Justice Statistics. 1993. Highlights from 20 years 
of surveying crime victims: The National Crime 
Victimization Survey, 1973-1992. Washington, D. C. 
Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence. (1995, 
January) .  Drugs, alcohol, and adolescent violence. 
Boulder, Colorado: Osgood. 
Champion, D. (1989) . Teenage Felons and Waiver Hearings: 
Some Recent Trends, 1980-198 8.  Crime & Delinquency, 
35 (4) , 579-585. 
Cisneros, Henry, G. 1995. Defensible Space: Deterring Crime 
and Building Community. Washington, D. C . :  U. S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
198 
Cohen, C. , & Horm-Wingerd, D. (1993) . Children and the 
environment: Ecological awareness among preschool 
children. Environment and Behavior, 25 (1) , 103-120. 
Coles, H. A . . (1995) . Effects of chronic violence . on inner 
city junior high school aged children (Doctoral 
dissertation, Pace University, 1995) . . Dissertation 
Abstracts International, 56. 
Dawson, J. M. , & Boland, B. (1993) . Murder in large urban 
counties, 1988 (NCJ-140614) . Washington, DC: U. S. 
Government Printing Office. 
DeFrances, C. J. , & Smith S. K. (1994) . Crime and 
neighborhoods (NCJ-147005) . Washington, DC: U. S. 
Government Printing Office. 
Dinges, D. F. , & Broughton, R. J. (Eds. ) . (1989) . Sleep and 
alertness: Chronobiological, behavioral, and medical 
aspects of napping. New York: Raven Press. 
Dodge, R. W. (1985) Locating city, suburban, and rural crime 
(NCJ-99535) . Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing 
Office. 
Dulrnus, C. N. (1998) . Trauma-related symptomatology among 
children of parents victimized by community violence 
(Doctoral dissertation, State University of New York at 
Buffalo, 1998) . Dissertation Abstracts International, 
60, 0656. 
199 
DuRant, R. , ·H. , Cadenhead C. , Pendergrast, R. A. , Slavens, 
G. , & Linder, C. W. , {1994) . Factors associated with . 
the use of violence among urban black adolescents. 
American Journal of Public Health, 84, 612-617. 
Elliott, D. S. {1994) . Serious violent offenders: Onset, 
developmental course, and termination--The American 
Society of Criminology 199 3  presidential address. 
Criminology, 32 (1) , 1-21. 
Elliot, D. S. {1994) . Youth violence: An overview. 
{Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence Paper 
No . {008) . Boulder, CO: University of Colorado. 
_Fox, G. L. , Bargen, J. V. , & Jester, M. {1996) . Managing 
murder: Parents as mediators of children's 
experience. Journal of Family Issues, 17 (6) , 732-757. 
Freidlander, B. Z. (1993 ) .  Community violence, children's 
development, and mass media: In pursuit of new 
insights, new goals, and new strategies. Psychiatry: 
Interpersonal and Biological Processes. 56 (1) , 66-8 1. 
Garbarino, J . ,  Dubrow, N. , Kostelny, K. , & Pardo C. {1992) . 
200 
Children in Danger: Coping with the Consequences of 
Community Violence. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 
Publishers. 
Garbarino, J . , & Kostelny, K. (1997) . What children can tell 
us about living in a war zone. In J.D. Osofsky (Ed.) 
Children in a violent society. (pp. 32-41) . New York: 
Guilford Press. 
Garbarino, J., Kostelny, K., & Dubrow, N. (1991) . No Place 
to Be a Child. Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington 
Books. 
Gary, L. E. , & Brown, L.P. (Eds.) . (1976) . Crime and its 
impact on the black community. Washington, D.C.: 
Howard University. 
Goering, J., Kamely, A., & Richardson, T. 1994. The Location 
and Racial Composition of Public Housing and Urban 
Development . 
Greene, M. B .  (1993) . Chronic exposure to violence and 
poverty: Interventions that work for youth. Crime & 
Delinquency, 39 (1) , 106-124. 
Guterman, N., Cameron, M., Straller, K. (2000) . Definitional 
and measurement issues in the study of community 
violence among children and youths. Journal of 
Community Psychology, 28, 571-587. 
Hamilton, S. F. (Ed. ) .  (1991) . Unrelated adults in 
adolescents' lives. Ithaca, NY : Cornell University. 
201 
Holzman, H. -R. , Kudrick, T. R. , & Voytek, K. P. (1996) . 
Revisiting the relationship between crime and 
architectural design: An analysis of data from HUD' s 
1994 survey of public housing residents. Cityscape, 2, 
(i) , 107-126. 
Holzman, H. R. , & Piper, L. (1998) . Measuring crime in 
public housing: Methodological issues and research 
strategies. Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 14, 
(4) , 331-351. 
Huesmann, L. R. , Maxwell, C. D. , Eron, L. , Dahlberg, L. L. , 
Guerra, N . G. ,  Tolan, P. H. , VanAcker, R. , & Henry, D. 
(1996) . Evaluating a cognitive/ecological program for 
the prevention of aggression among urban children. In 
K. E. Powell & D. F. Hawkins (Eds. ) ,  Youth violence 
prevention: Descriptions and baseline data from 13 
evaluation projects. (pp. 1220-128) . Cary, NC: Oxford 
University Press. 
Jenkins, E. J. , & Bell, C. C. (1997) .  Exposure and response 
to community violence among children and adolescents. 
In J. D. Osofsky (Ed. ) Children in a violent society. 
(pp. 9-31) . New York: Guilford Press. 
202 
Kissel, S. (1975) . The child psychotherapist' s changing role. 
Professional Psychology, 6, 261-266. 
Leavitt, L. A. , & Fox, N. A. (Eds. ) .  1993) . The psychological 
effects of war and violence· on children. Hillsdale, New 
Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaurn Associates. 
Lorion, R. & Sqltzman, W. (1993) . Children' s exposure to 
community violence: Following a path from concern to 
research to action. Psychiatry: Interpersonal and 
Biological Processes. 56 (1) , 55-65. 
Lowry, R. , Sleet, D. , ·  Duncan, C. , Powell, K. , & Kolbe, L. 
(1995) . Adolescents at Risk for Violence. Educational 
Psychology Review, 7 _(1) , 7-39. 
Maxwell, C. , & Maxwell, S. R. (1995) . Youth participation in 
hate-motivated crimes: research and policy implications 
(Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence Paper 
No. 003) . Boulder, CO: University of Colorado. 
McDowall, D. , McCleary, Meidinger, May (1980)
,-
Interrupted 
time series analysis. Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications. 
McEwen, T. (1995) . National assessment program: 1994 survey 
results (NIJ research in brief) (NCJ 153517) . 
Washington, DC : U. S. Government Printing Office. 
203 
Mercer. D. F. (1993) . The effects community violence on 
inner city school-age children (Doctoral dissertation, 
DePaul University, 1993) . Dissertatfon Abstracts 
International, 54. 
Mercer, J. A. , & Potter, L. B. (1996) . Combining analysis 
and action to solve the problem of youth violence. In 
K. E. Powell & D. F. Hawkins (Eds. ) ,  Youth violence 
prevention: Descriptions and baseline data from 13 
evaluation projects. (pp. 8 2-90) . Cary, NC: Oxford 
University Press. 
Messick, S .  (1993) . Validity. In R. L. Linn (Ed. ) ,  
Educational Measurement (pp. 13-103) . Phoenix, AZ: Oryx 
Press. 
Mitru, G., Millrood D. L. , Mateika, J H. (2002) . The impact 
of sleep on learning and behavior in adolescents. The 
Teachers College Record, 104, 704-726. 
National Center for Injury Prevention and Control . The 
prevention of youth violence : A framework for community 
action. Atlanta, GA: Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention, 1993. 
204 
National Center for Injury Prevention and Control. Youth 
violence in the United States. Atlanta, GA: Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 1996. 
National Center for Injury Prevention and Control. Firearm : 
injuries and fatalities. Atlanta, GA: Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, 1996. 
National Research Council. (1993) . Losing generations: 
Adolescents in high-risk settings. Washington, D. C. 
National Academy Press. 
National Research Council. (1977) . Noise abatement: Policy 
9lternative for transportation, Washington ,  D. C. June 
1977 (Vol. 8) . Washington, D. C. National Academy of 
Sciences. 
Nunnally, J. C. (1978) . Psychometric theory (2nd ed. ) .  New 
York: McGraw-Hill . .  
Osofsky, J. D �  (Ed. ) .  (1997) . Children in a violent society. 
New York: Guilford Press. 
Ostrom, Charles W. (1990) . Time Series Analysis Regression 
Techniques. Newbury Park: Sage Publications. 
Pease, K . ,  & Laycock G. (1996) . Revictimization: reducing 
the heat on hot victims, (NCJ-16295 1) . Washington, D. C: 
U. S. Government Printing Office. 
205 
Pedhazur, E � J. ,  & Schmelkin, L. P. (1991) . Measurement, 
design, and analysis: An integrated approach. 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Eribum Associates. 
Pennoyer, K. (1994) . Exposure to community violence, post­
traumatic stress and aspects of psychosocial 
functioning in adolescents living in inner-city 
neighborhoods (Doctoral dissertation, Adelphi 
University, 1994) . Dissertation Abstracts 
International, 55. 
Perkins, C. , ·& Klaus, P. (1996) Criminal victimization 
1994, (NCJ158022) Washington, D. C: U. S. Government 
Printing Office. 
Perry, B. (1997) . Incubated in Terror: Neurodevelopmental 
Factors in the "cycle of violence. ll In J. D. Osofsky 
(Ed. ) Children in a violent society. (pp. 124-149) . New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Popkin, S. J. , Gwiasda, V. E. , Rosenbaum, D. P. , Amendolia, 
J. M. ,  Johnson, J. S. , & Olson L. M. (1999) . Combating 
crime in public housing in Chicago: A qualitative and 
quantitative longitudinal analysis of the Chicago 
housing authority' s anti-drug initiative. Manuscript 
206 
submitted and accepted for publication in Justice 
Quarterly. 
Powell, K. E. , Dahibery, L. L. , Friday, J. , Mercy, J. A. , 
Thornton, T. , & Crawford, S. {1996) . Prevention of 
youth violence: rationaie and characteristics of 15 
evaluation projects. In K. W. Powell & D. F. Hawkins 
(Eds. ) ,  Youth violence prevention: Descriptions and 
baseline data from 13 evaluation projects. {pp. 91-
100) . Cary, NC: Oxford University Press. 
Rand, M. R. {1994) Carjacking, {NCJ147002) . Washington, D. C: 
U. S. Government Printing Office. 
Research Triangle Institute, {1994) . Survey of Public 
Housing Residents: Crime and Crime Prevention in Public 
Housing. Research Triangle Park. NC. 
Richers, J. E. , & Martinez, P. E. (1993) . The NIMH Community 
Violence Project I. : Children as victims of and 
wi�nesses to violence. Psychiatry Interpersonal and 
. Biological Processes, 56 (1) , 7- 21. 
Rosenberg, M. L. {1995) . Violence in America: An integrated 
approach to understanding and prevention. Journal of 
Health Care for the Poor and Underserved � (2) , 102-112. 
207 
Ross Roundt�bles on Critical Approaches to Common Pediatric 
Problems. (1991, September) . Children and violence 
(No. 23) . Columbus, Ohio. 
Rothery, M. (1993) . The Positivistic Research Approach. In 
R. M. Grinnell (Ed. ) ,  Social Work Research and 
Evaluation (pp. 38-87) . Itasca, IL: Peacock. 
Satcher, D. , Powell, K. , Marcy, J. A. , & Rosenberg, M. L. 
(1996) . Violence is as American as apple pie. In K. E. 
Powell & D. F. Hawkins (Eds. ) ,  Youth violence 
Prevention: Descriptions and baseline data from 13 
evaluation projects. (pp. v-vi) . Cary, NC: Oxford 
University Press. 
Saylor, C. F. (Ed. ) .  (1993) . Children and Disasters. New 
York: Plenum Press. 
Scheaffer, R. L. , Mendenhall, W. , & Ott, L. (1990) . Elementary 
Survey Sampling (4th ed. ) .  Boston: PWS-KENT Publishing 
Company. 
Schultz, T. J. (1982) . Community noise rating (2nd ed. ) .  
New York: Applied Science Publishers. 
Sheley, J. F. , & Wright, J. D. (1993, December) . Gun 
pcquisition and possession in selected juvenile 
samples. National Institute of Justice Office of 
208 
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Research in 
Brief, 1-11. 
Thomas, W. I. ( 1967) � The unadjusted girls with case� and 
standpoint foi behavior anaJysis. New York : Harper & 
Row. 
Toennies, F. (1988) . Community and society (Rev. ed. ) . New 
Brunswick, NJ : Transaction Publishers. 
Tolan, P. , & Guerra, N. (1994) . What works in reducing 
adolescent violence : An empirical review of the field. 
Boulder, Colorado : University of Colorado, Center for 
the Study & Prevention of Violence. 
U. S. Department of Health & Human Services. (1998) . 
Measuring violence-related attitudes, beliefs, and 
behaviors among youths : A compendium of assessment 
tools. Atlanta, GA : Centers . for Disease Control and 
Prevention. 
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (1997) . � 
guide to evaluating crime control of programs in public 
housing. Washington, DC : U. S. Government Printing 
Office. 
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. (2000) . In 
the crossfire : the impact of gun violence on public 
209 
housing communities. Washington, DC: U. S. Government 
Printing Office. 
U. S. Department of Justice. {1993) . Uniform crime reports 
for the United States. Washington, DC: U. S. Government· 
Printing Office. 
U. S. Department ·of Justice. {1994) . Drugs and Crime facts, 
1994 ( NCJ-154043) . Washington DC: U. S. Government 
Printing Office. 
U. S. Department of Justice. {1994) . National crime 
victimization survey redesign: questions and answers 
{NCJ 151171) . Washington DC: U. S. Government Printing 
Office. 
U. S. Department of Justice. {1994) . Violent crime {NCJ-
147486) . Washington DC: U. S. Government Printing 
Office. 
U. S. Department of Justice. (1995) . The nations' two crime 
measures. {NCJ-122795) . Washington DC: U. S. Government 
Printing Office. 
U. S. Department of Justice. {1995, January) . Weapon-related 
victimization in selected inner-city high school 
samples. National Institute of Justice Update. 
W�shington DC: U. S. Government Printing Office. 
210 
U. S. Department of Justice. (1996} . Criminal victimization 
1994 (NCJ-158022} . Washington DC: U. S. Government 
Printing Office. 
U. S. Department of Justice. (1997} . Correctional populations 
in the United States, 1995 (NCJ-163916} . Washington DC: 
U. S. Government Printing Office. 
U. S. Department of Justice. (1997} . Criminal victimization 
in the United States, 1994 (NCJ-162126} . Washington 
DC: U. S. Government Printing Office. 
U. S. Department of Justice. (1997} . Ethnicity, crime, and 
immigration, (NCJ-000170} .  Washington, DC: U. S. 
Government Printing Office. 
U. S. Department of Justice. (1997} . Juvenile offenders and 
victims: 1997 update on violence, (NCJ-165703} . 
Washington, DC : U. S. Government Printing Office. 
U. S. Department of Justice. (2001} . Criminal victimization 
in the United States, 1999 (NCJ-184938) . Washington DC: 
U. S. Government Printing Office . 
Weber, M. (2002} . The protestant ethic and the "spirit" of 
capitalism (P. Baehr & G. C. Wells, Trans. ) .  England: 
Penguin Books. (Original work published 1905) . 
211 
Welch, B.·L. & Welch A. S. (Eds. ) .  (1970) . Physiological 
Effects of Noise . . New York: Plenum Press. 
Zawitz, M. W. (1996) . Firearm injury from crime. (NCJ-
160093) . Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing 
Office. 
Zawitz, M. W. , Klaus, P. A. , Bachman, R. , Bastian, L. D. , 
DeBerry, M. M. , Rand, M. R. , & Taylor B. M. (1993) . The 
National Crime Victimization Survey, 1973-92. (NCJ-
144525) . Washington, DC: U. S. Government Printing 
Office. 
Zelon, H. , Rohe, B. , Leaman, S. , & Williams, S. (1994) . 
212 
Survey of public housing residents: Crime and crime 
prevention in public housing, Research Triangle Park, 
North Carolina. 
( 
APPENDICES 
213 
APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
) 
2 1 4 
Questionnaire 
Appendix A 
If this is not a convenient time , try to make an 
appointment to call again-
For any of the following questions , if the person 
says they do not know , ask them to give their best 
estimate or guess . 
1. Do you ever hear gunshots in your neighborhood? 
Yes No 
2.  Thinking back over the last week, which time of 
day had more gunshots? 
Day (5:01 a. m. to 5:00 p. m. ) 
Night (5:01 p. m. to 5:00 a. m. ) 
Same 
3. To the best of your knowledge which day of the 
week had the most gunshots in the last 7 days? 
Monday Saturday --- ---
Tuesday --- Sunday ---
Wednesday ---
Thursday __ _ 
Friday ---
4. Has gunfire ever bothered your sleeping? 
Yes ___ No 
5 .  It is now _______ o'clock. Over the last 24 
hours, about how many gunshots did you hear in 
your neighborhood? 
6. About how many hours were you in your home or 
neighborhood yesterday? 
215 
7. How long have you lived. in your present home? 
less than one year ---
one to three years ---
three years or more ---
8 .  Do you have any questions? 
216 
If you have questions about your rights as a 
participant, contact the Compliance Section of 
The Office of Research at (865) 974-3466. 
If you have any additional questions contact 
Sylvia Sergent at (865) 237-7564. 
Thank-you for your help. 
APPENDIX B 
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INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT 
Appendix B 
A Criterion Va1iclity Study of Inclividua1s' Reports of 
Gunfire and Recorded Gunfire 
INTRODUCTION 
Hello, my name is (Data Collector' s Name) . I' m 
helping with a study being conducted by the College of 
Social Work at the University of Tennessee. Is this a 
convenient time to call? The purpose of this study is to 
better understand about gunshots in neighborhoods. The· 
interview takes about 3-4 minutes. The questions are 
about gunshots in your neighborhood. · All information 
will be kept confidential and no names will be recorded. 
No one will be able to identify who answers questions. 
The interview is voluntary, and will not affect any 
services you or your family receives. Also you may 
decide to quit the interview at any time with no 
penalties. 
Do you have any questions? 
Do you understand what the study is about? 
If the person understands what the study is about , go to 
the next section . 
INFORMATION ABOUT PARTICIPANTS' INVOLVEMENT IN THE STUDY 
You will be asked to answer seven questions about 
gunshots and your neighborhood. If you decide to take 
part in this study, you may change your mind at any time 
and quit the interview. Also if you feel stress 
answering questions about gunfire, please do not answer 
the questions. The study is to increase understanding 
about gunfire, not to increase anyone' s  discomfort. 
2 18 
RISKS 
There is a small risk that answering questions about 
gunfire may -cause stress. To protect you, please do not 
answer any questions that make you feel stressed. Also, 
I have the phone numbers of two counseling centers in 
case you feel the need to talk with someone. The 
telephone numbers are 539-2409 and 521-6336. 
BENEFITS 
The benefit of this study is to gain a better 
understanding of gunfire in neighborhoods. 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
The information in this study will be kept confidential. 
Immediately after this phone call your address and phone 
number will be shredded. Answers to questions will be 
kept in a locked filing case available only to people 
doing the research, and there will be no way to link your 
name with what you tell me. After the study is 
completed the questionnaires will be kept on the U. T. 
campus in a secure location for three years. No 
reference will be made in oral or written reports which 
could link any participant to this study. 
CONTACT INFORMATION 
If you- have questions at any time about the study or 
would like to talk more about this subject, you may 
contact Sylvia Sergent, at 865-237-7564.  If you have 
questions about your rights as a participant, contact the 
Compliance Section of The University of Tennessee Office 
of Research at (865 ) 974-3466 . 
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PARTICIPATION 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You may 
decide not to participate or to quit at any time without 
any consequences. 
Are you willing to voluntarily participate in this study? 
If no , thank the person for their time . Shred the 
address and phone number . 
If yes , continue with the questionnaire . 
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